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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
This study began as an investigation into the
clinical trainee's experiences of projective
identification. The literature on projective
identification describes this phenomenon as a powerful
and often frightening experience. Casement (1985)
suggests that familiarity with the concept of projective
identification could help clinicians understand certain
aspects of countertransf erence . A familiarity with this
concept would appear to be an important part of clinical
training
.
After gathering the data it became clear that
trainees' experiences with projective identification were
not clearly delineated from experiences with
countertransference or empathy. The study has evolved
into looking at how trainees learn to use their internal
experience in the service of understanding their clients.
The data analysis examines the issues involved for
trainees as they learn an empathic use of self. The
salient themes include the following: learning to
alternate between the observing and experiencing parts of
the ego; learning to identify the origin of affect; and
1
problems in empathizing. The literature review section
analyzes the concepts of empathy, projective
identification and countertransf erence to provide a
foundation for the discussion. Additional relevant
literature will be examined in the discussion section.
Empathy
Over thirty years ago Theodore Reik (1937) bemoaned
the lack of consensus about the concept of empathy:
I note with a certain envy that my difficulty
in describing the process of psychological
comprehension adequately does not exist for
many psychologists. Faced with my problem, the
expression 'empathy' readily occurs to their
minds and flows from their pens. Indeed this
expression sounds so full of meaning that
people willingly overlook its ambiguity. To
speak of empathy has on occasion been as
senseless as to discuss sitting in a box
without distinguishing whether one means a
compartment in a theatre, the driver's seat or
a big case. The word empathy sometimes means
one thing, sometimes another, until now it does
not mean anything, (pp. 356-357)
When he wrote this, Reik was making one of the first, if
now little recognized contributions to the literature on
empathy. This now voluminous literature abounds with
sophisticated analyses of the psychological processes
that underlie a therapist's empathic functioning,
analyses that are varied and often contradictory.
Empathy exists outside the clinical setting but its
more specific clinical usage departs significantly from
how it is understood in everyday usage (Beres & Arlow,
1974; Berger, 1987; Schafer, 1959). Everyday usage has
2
blurred the essential neutrality of the empathic process
(Basch, 1983b). Too often, empathy is understood as
having positive feelings for another, "especially love,
compassion, and sympathy, and particular forms of
behavior, specifically indulgence, gratification, and
infantilization" (Basch, p. 122). Berger suggests that
in everyday usage the essential neutrality of clinical
empathy is lost due to the understanding that an empathic
person could be described as: "sensitive to the needs and
feelings of others ;.. tactful
,
altruistic, sympathetic,
indulgent" (p. 5). Greenson (1960) also differentiates
empathy from feelings such as sympathy, pity, or
sorrow.
A clinician's empathic functioning denotes a special
mode of perceiving the inner experience of a patient. It
is an "emotional knowing" of the state of another, a
sharing in or an experiencing of the other's feelings
(Berger, 1987; Greenson, 1960). In a clinical setting
not only the conscious state is shared but the
unconscious experience as well. Schafer (1959) offers a
definition that emphasizes that it is all levels of the
patient's mind that is shared. He names the functioning
of a therapist as "generative empathy" to distinguish a
therapist's empathy from other forms:
Generative empathy may be defined as the inner
experience of sharing in and comprehending the
momentary psychological state of another
person. Specifically, what is to be shared and
comprehended is a hierarchic organization of
desires, feelings, thoughts, defenses,
controls, superego pressures, capacities, self
representations and representations of real andfantasied personal relationships, (p. 345)
Though subjectively empathy is seemingly simple, it
is actually a complex psychological process (Buie, 1981)
and too often taken for granted (Beres & Arlow, 1974).
It is usually understood as occurring preconsciously and
automatically (Schafer, 1959), and as involving both the
therapist's conscious and unconscious reactions. Empathy
is generally seen as involving affective responsiveness
and cognitive mediations. A subjective sense of losing
the boundaries between the self and one's object or a
merging of the internal representations of self and other
are often part of empathic activity (Beres & Arlow, 1974;
Olinick, 1969; Schafer, 1959; Sandler & Rosenblatt,
1962); as is an ego regression on the part of the
therapist (Fleiss, 1942; Issacharoff, 1984; Schafer,
1959; Olinick, 1969). Most of the literature about the
mechanisms that underlie a therapist's empathic
responsiveness reference these aspects. However, there
are many explanations of the empathic process and there
is little agreement about how empathy occurs. The
following four bases of empathic functioning will be
reviewed here: identification, affective resonance, a
working model of the client, and inference. Buie, Basch
{1983b) and Berger (1987) provide analyses of
metapsychological considerations and disagreements.
4
questions and consensus amongst different views of
empathic functioning. This study considers empathic
functioning to be primarily based upon identification.
Identification
Fleiss (1942) is credited with having first
conceptualized empathy as based upon a therapist's
identification with a patient's repressed impulses.
However, two earlier works presaged his contribution,
works which possibly were overlooked since they did not
adhere to the "classical" view that countertransf erence
is a hindrance to treatment.
In 1926, embedded in a paper on the occult processes
in psychoanalysis, Helene Deutsch offered some visionary
yet neglected observations about the nature of both
empathy and countertransf erence . She suggested that the
formation of unconscious identifications with the
patient's infantile wishes and impulses was the basis for
a therapist's empathy: "...empathy is precisely the gift
of being able to experience the object by means of an
identification" (p. 137). It is only through analyzing
1.
his affective response that the therapist is able to
understand this response as an identification with his
patient's material:
1. Regarding terminology: In keeping with the
terminology of those I quote, a terminology that reflects
both their reality and their bias, I will use the male
pronoun in this section. In the discussion section, I
will use the female pronoun to refer to the therapist, as
this more accurately reflects my interview subjects.
5
The affective psychic content of the patient,
which emerges from his unconscious, becomes
transmuted into an inner experience of the
analyst, and is recognized as belonging to thepatient (i.e., to the external world) only in
the course of subsequent intellectual work
(1926, p. 136)
Reik (1937) suggested a similar process of
unconscious arousal in the therapist which made possible
a deeper understanding of a patient. As an early
proponent of the usefulness of such feelings, Reik argued
that it was through attending to his inner affective
response that a therapist is able to understand the
unconscious communication from a patient:
The united or conflicting effect of the
(patient's) words, gestures, and unconscious
signals, which point to the existence of
certain hidden impulses and ideas, will
certainly not at first stimulate the observing
analyst to psychological comprehension. Their
first effect will rather be to rouse in himself
unconsciously impulses and ideas with a like
tendency. The unconscious reception of the
signals will not at first result in their
interpretation, but in the induction (in the
analyst) of the hidden impulses and emotions
that underlie them. (p. 193)
and
The observation of other people's suppressed
and repressed impulses is only possible by the
roundabout way of inner perception. In order
to comprehend the unconscious of another
person, we must, at least for a moment, change
ourselves into and become that person, (p. 199)
Though he termed this process a "temporary intro jection"
he paralled Fleiss's ideas on identification (Tansey &
Burke, 1989).
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Fleiss (1953) suggested that in empathic
functioning, the therapist takes the patient into himself
"in order to experience (the patient's) feelings"
(p. 280). He termed this process a "trial identification"
and formulated empathy as:
a person who uses empathy on an object
introjects this object transiently, and
projects the introject again onto the object.
(1942, p. 214)
Fleiss believed that this trial identification allowed
for "introspection on an object that while external, has
become internal for the moment" (1953, p. 280). He
suggested that such a sequence of intro jection,
introspection and then ( re ) pro j ec t ion allowed for a
particular type of reality testing: the scrutiny of the
thoughts and feelings of the patient inside the
therapist. This process allowed for the experiencing of
the patient's feelings as one's own. Fleiss appears to
limit the range of what is taken in to be only that of
repressed impulses. Others broaden the range to include
defenses against that impulse (Schafer, 1959; Beres &
Arlow, 1974; Olinick, 1969).
Deutsch, Reik and Fleiss all write within a drive
theory perspective; consequently, that which is
identified with is conceptualized as infantile wishes and
impulses, not internalized object relationships. In a
groundbreaking work in which he argued that a therapist's
countertransf erence is useful, Racker (1957)
7
conceptualized two types of identifications that occur
with patients' internal representations. The first he
termed a "concordant identification": the therapist's
identification with the ego or conscious experience of
the patient. Sandler (1987) has elaborated this as the
therapist's identification with the patient's phantasy
self representation of the moment. A "complementary
identification" is the therapist's identification with
the patient's internalized objects; or with the object
representation in the patient's transference phantasy
(Sandler). With few exceptions, (Beres & Arlow, 1974;
Deutsch, 1926; Schafer, 1959; Tansey & Burke, 1989),
empathy has been considered to consist of only concordant
identifications.
Beres and Arlow (1974) developed the role that
identification plays in the empathic process and termed
it as a "transient identification." They suggested that
there were
two distinguishing features to empathy: one, it
is a transient identification; second, the
empathizer preserves his separateness from the
object . ( p . 33
)
The "transient identification" is experienced as "feeling
with" the patient, or as sharing in the patient's
affect. The resulting "sense of oneness" with the object
must be "followed by a sense of separateness" which is
able to occur when the therapist breaks off the transient
identification and replaces "the thinking and feeling
8
with the patient" to "thinking about the patient"
(p. 39). Thus, Beres and Arlow emphasize that empathy
involves a cognitive component as well as a sharing of
affect. The therapist must separate from the transient
identification and switch from participation in the
patient's affective state to trying to understand what
has been unconsciously communicated. The therapist must
use his affect as a cue to make this switch:
The affect experienced by the therapist we
suggest is in the nature of a signal affect, a
momentary identification with the patient which
leads to the awareness, 'This is what my
patient may be feeling, (p. 35)
Beres and Arlow suggest that narcissistic individuals
face difficulties empathizing due to their desire to
merge with their object for narcissistic gratification
and consequent difficulties in maintaining a sense of
separatene ss
.
Objections have been raised to conceptualizing
empathy as based upon identifications because such a use
of identification departs from its usual usage as
denoting a defense mechanism or as involved in the
process of structural ization (Berger, 1987; Buie, 1981).
Buie concludes that authors who consider identification
as the basis for empathic functioning are using the term
identification in a "nontechnical descriptive sense"
(p. 29). Identification is used to imply the taking in
of the object of empathic focus but a change in the
empathizer that would be expected from a usual process of
9
identification does not occur. In contrast, Tansey and
Burke (1989) say the identifications involved in empathy
do change the empathizer and contribute to the formation
of a special structure-the therapist's work ego.
Basch (1983b) agrees that the term identification is
not used in the usual sense of internal structural change
to be like another:
The identification that takes place in an
empathic encounter is not with the other person
per se, but with what he is experiencing. It
is a matter of concluding that one's own
affective state duplicates that of the other,
the presumed similarity permitting one to
identify one's own affective position as
representative of the other's mental state at a
particular moment, (p. 105)
Nonetheless, the use of the term identification
highlights that there is an "involuntary, unconsciously
mediated transformation within the analyst that is
fundamental for the empathic experience" (Basch, p. 106).
Working Model
Greenson (1960) contends that empathy is not based
upon an identification process. He offers the
alternative view that empathy is based upon utilizing a
"working model" of a patient. By "listening through" the
working model the therapist attempts to experience the
patient's feelings. Greenson describes a working model:
a) All I know of the patient: experiences,
modes of behavior, memories, fantasies,
resistances, defences, dreams, associations,
etc. All this is the skeleton and basic
structure
.
b) I diminish the quantity of resistance.
(The working model of the patient within me is
not merely a replica of the patient. If that
10
were so, the model would have the same
resistances as the patient and would not supply
me with clues. The model has resistances and
defences similar in quality but less in
degree
. )
c) I add my conception of his potentials.
d) I add my theoretical knowledge and clinical
experience
.
e) In addition all my experiences with similar
kinds of people and situations-real or
fantasied. (p. 422)
Greenson suggests that since empathizing means to share
in another's feelings, the analyst must actually "become
involved in the emotional experiences of the patient" (p.
420). This necessitates a split in the therapist's ego
functioning to allow for an oscillation between
participating in and observing the emotional experience.
At times of experiencing, the working model is shifted
into the foreground and what is "peculiarly or uniquely"
the therapist is de-emphasized and isolated. Greenson
suggests that only those therapists who are secure in
their sense of identity can tolerate the "temporary de-
cathexis" of one's self image that is necessary for
empathy
.
Under successful empathic listening the patient's
communications will produce what Greenson calls an "aha"
experience
:
I use the term 'aha' to epitomize that
involuntary and pleasant sensation of suddenly
grasping and understanding something hitherto
obscure, (p. 421-422)
This experience serves the same purpose as a "signal
affect" (Beres & Arlow, 1974) and alerts the therapist to
11
analyze what has occurred. Greenson specifies that these
stages do not happen in a linear sequence but occur
intermittently, automatically, quickly and
preconsciously
.
Affective Resonance
The interplay of affective responses and cognitive
analysis of those responses has been emphasized thus
far. Basch (1983b), in contrast, suggests a model for
empathy that is primarily affective. He believes what
others have termed trial or transient identifications
should be understood as instances of "affective
resonance." Affective resonance-the ability to be
effected by another's affective display-stems from the
emotional communion experienced between mother and
infant. Affective resonance is a process by which the
therapist generates in himself a similar affective state
by virtue of an unconscious imitation of the facial and
bodily expressions of the patient. A capacity for
empathy is rooted in early infantile experiences of
merger (Basch, 1983b; Ferreira, 1961; Olden, 1953).
Inference
Buie's (1981) view of empathy is rooted more in
cognitive than affective processes although he does
acknowledge the importance of the latter in some cases of
affective communication. He concedes that early
infantile experiences of affective communication may play
a role in empathic functioning but argues that empathy is
more a cognitive than affective process. Buie says that
12
empathy is an "ordinary" perceptual process involving
inferential reasoning about the patient's inner state:
Empathy depends on sensory perception ofbehavioral cues from the object about his inner
state. The empathizer compares these
behavioral cues with one or more kinds of
referents in his own mind which could be
expressed by similar behavior. He then infers
that the inner experience of the object
qualitatively matches that associated with his
referent, (p. 305)
The processing of these cues is both conscious and
unconscious. The therapist compares these perceived cues
against internal referents and then draws inferences
about the patient's inner experience. Buie identifies
four categories of such internal referents.
Sel f -Experience Referents consist of memories
available to the analyst from his own past and can be
represented as "impulses, affects, body feelings and
superego pressures" (p. 291). What others call temporary
identifications could fit here though Buie specifies
these referents have a low affective intensity.
Imagination Imitation Referents are created when no self-
experience referents fit the patient's material.
Resonance Referents are the most likely to correspond to
the actual inner state of the patient and could
correspond with Basch's view of empathy. These occur
when the strong affect experienced by the patient
stimulates the same affect in the analyst. Buie says
affect contagion is a natural response to strong emotions
in others. The analyst's affective intensity exceeds
13
those felt through the self
-experience referents.
Conceptual Referents have the least affective arousal and
are primarily cognitive. These abstract concepts
represent the analysts general knowledge and are drawn
from artistic, literary and mythological frameworks.
There also exist specific conceptual referents which are
"comprised of particular self and object representations
as well as certain intro j ects
.
" Included here also is a
referent of an internal model of the patient (Greenson,
1960). Buie specifies that the empathic process is
vulnerable to three limitations: the desire of a patient
to not be empathized with; the therapist's inadequate
referents; and the inherent uncertainty of the
inferential process.
Schafer (1959) does not offer a model of the
empathic process but in his discussion of how clinical
empathy differs from other forms of empathy incorporates
many of the above ideas. He stresses that empathy
requires both affective and cognitive elements. Relying
too heavily upon cognition prevents the kind of ego
regression that is necessary for sharing in another's
experience. Relying too exclusively upon affect results
in "intolerable reactivity involving an illusion of
identity, fusion of the ego with the object" (p. 349).
Echoing Beres and Arlow (1974), Schafer stresses that the
experienced affect is to serve as a signal for
understanding the patient. Like Greenson (1960), Schafer
14
suggests that over time, "an internal image of the
patient is built in the therapist's mind, an image based
upon "partial intro j ections
, emotional reactions, and
revival of memories concerning oneself and the object"
(p. 351).
Projectiv e Identification
Projective identification is roost simply defined as
"unconscious projective fantasies in association with the
evocation of congruent feelings in others" (Ogden,
p. 1). Projective identification is about a person
splitting off feelings or internal representations and
producing in someone else emotions or experiences which
resemble their own. What is important about this is the
activation of feelings in others in addition to the
projective activity. Projective identification addresses
the phenomenon of how one person (the projector) uses
another person (the recipient) to contain an unwanted or
an endangered aspect of the self. In a clinical context,
projective identification addresses the phenomenon of
clients using their therapist to contain unwanted or less
often, threatened parts of themselves.
Projective identification is most commonly thought
of and learned as a primitive defense mechanism, which,
along with splitting, is characteristic of individuals
with an underlying borderline character organization. In
this context, it is considered to be a primitive and
pathological process. In contrast, while acknowledging
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the reliance on projective identification as a defense
mechanism utilized by borderlines, others (Grotstein,
1981; Horwitz, 1983; Langs, 1976; Malin & Grotstein,
1966; Ogden, 1982; Scarf, 1986) consider projective
identification to occur at all levels of personality
organization/functioning and to be a common dynamic in
close relationships. Most importantly, some authors
(Malin & Grotstein, 1966; Ogden, 1982; Bion, 1959) view
therapist's handling of a projective identification as
the main source of change in psychotherapy.
Ogden (1982) delineates the following functions of
projective identification, all of which can be part of a
clinical encounter:
1) a type of defense by which one can distance
oneself from an unwanted or internally
endangered part of the self, while in fantasy
keeping that aspect of the self alive in the
recipient; 2) a mode of communication by which
the projector makes himself understood by
exerting pressure on the recipient to
experience a set of feelings similar to his
own; 3) a type of ob ject-relatedness in which
the projector experiences the recipient as
separate enough to serve as a receptacle for
parts of the self but sufficiently
undifferentiated to maintain the illusion of
literally sharing the projector's feeling; 4) a
pathway for psychological change by which
feelings similar to those which the projector
is struggling with are processed by the
recipient, thus allowing the projector to
identify with the recipient's handling of the
engendered feelings (pp. 36-37)
Significant confusion and controversy surround the
topic of projective identification. Finell (1986),
Meissner (1980) and Whipple (1986) are among those
16
critical of the concept. Projective identification has
been used to explain various psychological phenomena; its
meaning has changed over time; and it deals with both
intrapsychic and interpersonal realms of experience,
often without adequately differentiating between the two
(Ogden, 1982; Horwitz, 1983). Both self and object
representations can be projected and there are numerous
motivations for projective identification: the wish to
rid the self of unwanted self objects or wishes to
dominate, devalue, control and fuse with the recipient
(Horwitz, 1983). Finally, discussions of projective
identification often do not adequately distinguish it
from the concept of projection nor adequately distinguish
between the projector and the recipient.
Distinctions drawn between projective identification
and projection are inconsistent but two of the most
common are relevant to the clinical encounter. The first
concerns the degree of splitting that accompanies the
projection (Grotstein, 1981). Ogden (1982) argues that
the degree of splitting in projection is more complete,
whereas in projective identification, the projector
maintains a connection with what is projected. In
projective identification:
...the projector subjectively experiences a
feeling of oneness with the recipient with
regard to the expelled feeling, idea or self-
representation. By contrast, in pro lection the
aspect of the self that is in fantasy expelled
is disavowed and attributed to the recipient.
The projector does not feel kinship with
17
recipient; on the contrary, the recipient is
often experienced as foreign, strange, andfrightening, (pp. 34-35)
Langs (1976) similarly argues that in projective
identification the projector maintains a tie to what is
projected. He says that in projective identification,
the term identification is not being used in an
incorporative direction but in an externalizing
direction
:
The term identification is applied in an
unusual manner in the term projective
identification; it refers to the subject's
continued attachment to-identif ication with-the
contents that he has externalized and to his
efforts to evoke an identification in the
object, (p. 277 ) .
Consequently, a blurring of boundaries between the
projector and recipient occur in projective
identification but not in projection.
The second distinction drawn between projection and
projective identification is that in the later, the
recipient is affected and made to experience himself in
accordance with what is projected; whereas in projection
there is no impact upon the recipient. Ogden (1982)
emphasizes the interpersonal aspects of this concept to
highlight the effect on the recipient as a result of the
interpersonal pressure which accompanies the projective
activity.
One approach to distinguishing between projection
and projective identification on the basis of their
effect on the recipient is Horwitz's (1983) distinction
18
that directionally, projection is onto and does not
necessarily penetrate the recipient. A projective
identification, in contrast, sinks into the recipient and
modifies the latter's self perception. In projection,
all that is distorted is the perception of the
projector.
Many distinguish projective identification from
projection by the interaction that is part of projective
identification (Finell, 1986; Gillman, 1980; Langs, 1976;
Tansey & Burke, 1985; Ogden, 1982). Langs eloquently
states this distinction by defining projection as the
projector " intrapsychically attributing" whereas
projective identification is an attempt to
" interactionally place" (p. 259) an aspect of the self
into the recipient. The interaction element is also
emphasized in Casement's description of projective
identification as the
product of interactional pressures upon the
analyst from the patient, which are
unconsciously aiming to evoke in him the
unbearable feeling state which the patient
could not on her own yet contain within
herself. (1985, p. 292)
Unlike projection which is solely the disavowal of
fantasy or feeling on the client's part with no impact on
the therapist, projective identification involves the
therapist experiencing the client's feelings within
him/herself. The therapist's feelings occur as a result
19
of the client's verbal and nonverbal behavior and are
experienced as part of countertransf erence
.
Another important distinction between projection and
projective identification is that in the latter the
client identifies with the therapist, whereas in
projection the therapist is experienced by the client as
alien or estranged. This is sometimes an important
feature of projective identification in that the element
of identifying with the therapist is an attempt to
"master" what has been projected by seeing how the
therapist deals with it.
Ogden delineates three phases to projective
identification
:
In the initial phase, the projector
unconsciously fantasies getting rid of an
aspect of the self and putting that aspect into
another person in a controlling way. Secondly,
via the interpersonal interaction, the
projector exerts pressure on the recipient to
experience feelings that are congruent with the
projection. Finally, the recipient
psychologically processes the projection and
makes a modified version of it available for
reinternalization by the projector, (p. 36)
Ogden calls the second phase the induction phase. During
this phase the recipient is pressured by the projector to
experience himself in ways that correspond to the
unconscious fantasies and to identify with what has been
projected. Communication and a form of object
relatedness are functions of this phase.
Ogden develops the third phase as being the process
by which psychological change occurs. This is the phase
20
where the projection is processed by the recipient and
given back to the projector for reinternalization
.
During this phase the recipient experiences himself in
accordance with the unconscious fantasy but the feelings
are modified due to having been introjected by a more
integrated personality. Ogden asserts that due to the
recipient's idiosyncratic personality the processing of
any projection is incomplete, but to the extent that the
projection is processed by the recipient and
reinternalized by the projector, psychological growth in
the projector results. Reinternalization can range
according to the maturational level of the projector from
introjection to identification, thus precipitating
different degrees of change. As part of a therapeutic
process, this phase can involve "offering" back the
projection in the form of an interpretation. It can also
involve behaving differently than the client in dealing
with the projected feelings. Psychological growth is
promoted by the therapist providing alternative ways of
handling the feelings through making the modified
projection available in the form of interpretations or
interpersonal interaction.
Others agree that the successful handling of a
patient's projective identification is the basis for
change in psychotherapy. Bion (1959) posits as the
single most important form of interaction between patient
and therapist, the containment and processing of
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projective identifications in the more integrated
personality of the therapist. He emphasizes the
importance of the therapist remaining open to the
patient's projective identification, in some ways for
similar reasons that a mother remaining open to an
infant's projective identification is necessary for
normal development: "projective identification makes
possible for him to investigate his own feelings in a
personality powerful enough to contain them" (p. 314)
In subscribing to the view that therapeutic change
involves structural change in the ego (Leowald, 1960)
Malin and Grotstein (1966) suggest that
(P)rojective identification helps explain the
development of these higher levels of ego
integration .... We suggest, moreover, that this
method of projecting one's inner psychic
contents into external objects and then
perceiving the response of these external
objects and introjecting this response on a new
level of integration is the way in which the
human organism grows psychically, nurtured by
his environment .... The essence of the
therapeutic process is through modification of
internal object relationships within the ego,
and this is largely brought about by projective
identification (p. 28).
Ogden concurs:
The idea that there is something therapeutic
about the therapist's containment of the
patient's projective identification is based
upon an interpersonal conception of individual
psychological growth: one learns from (in
fantasy, 'takes in qualities') another person
on the basis of interactions in which the
projector ultimately takes back
( reinternalizes ) an aspect of himself that has
been integrated and slightly modified by the
recipient. (1982, p. 40)
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Kernberg (1965) also asserts that the modification of a
patient's complementary projective identification may
"provide a cornerstone of the work with a particular
patient" (p. 48).
A patient is able to grow from how the therapist
contains and deals with a projective identification
because often what is projected is unbearable and
intolerable to the patient. It is for this reason that
it has been projected. In this light the importance of
the therapist's containing and tolerating the experience
becomes apparent. Casement (1985) suggests that patients
perceive when the therapist cannot tolerate the feelings
either. The patient experiences the therapist as "thrown
off balance" and "the sense that these feelings are
unmanageable is traumatical ly confirmed" (p. 82). A
therapist's management of a patient's projective
identification helps the patient see that another being
has been able to tolerate the experience. It is stressed
that along with re internal izing the projection, the
patient also takes in some of the therapist's capacity to
tolerate the feelings. (Casement; Malin & Grotstein,
1966). A failure of containment confirms the patient's
worse fears.
Additional importance in therapy of projective
identification is in making available to the therapist
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through his own experience data about the internal world
of the patient that would not otherwise be
understandable
:
The therapist who has to some extent allowedhimself to be molded by this interpersonalpressure and is able to observe these changesin himself has access to a very rich source ofdata about the patient's internal world-theinduced set of thoughts and f eelings-which are
experientially alive, vivid, and immediate.(Ogden, 1982, p. 4)
A third implication for the therapeutic relationship
is the use of projective identification for understanding
counter-transference. Through understanding a
countertransference reaction in response to a projective
identification, previously hidden aspects of the
transference can be illuminated. Ogden (1982) sees
countertransference reactions as resulting from both
"concordant" and "complementary" identifications. Others
(Finell, 1986; Horwitz, 1983) delineate the
countertransference reactions that result from a
patient's projective identification as only complementary
identifications in that the therapist unconscious
reaction complements the patient's conscious experience.
Sandler (1987) associates the view that projective
identification consists of concordant identifications
with Bion's (1967) notions of the therapist as a
container
.
It is important to consider how an understanding of
projective identification helps a therapist to understand
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his countertransference reactions. A common theme runs
through the literature that a projective identification
produces a feeling that one is not being oneself
(Grinberg, 1962), or is acting out of character (Gilmore
& Krantz, 1985) or playing a part in another's fantasy
(Ogden, 1982). Often this is a judgement that is reached
retrospectively since the therapist's unconscious
participation often precedes his recognition.
The issue of countertransference reactions as a
result of a projective identification illuminates a
problematic implication of this concept. Finell (1986)
Meissner (1980) and Whipple (1986) object to the blurring
of boundaries between self and other implied in the
description that the therapist receives a projected part
object of a client. Ogden suggests that the threat this
poses is one reason the concept has been resisted. While
a defensive stance of maintaining a rigid view of
impenetrable and fixed boundaries precludes an
appreciation of this concept, the question being raised
of what mental content belongs to the patient and what to
the therapist is an important one. Ogden suggests that
When the therapist suspects that he has
developed an intensely held, but highly limited
view of himself and the patient that is in an
important sense shared by the patient, he is
very likely serving as an object of the
patient's projective identification, (p. 73)
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Empathy and ProiP ctive Tdf>ntif ication
Empathy and projective identification have usually
been considered to be very different mechanisms occurring
at different times in the therapeutic process.
Projective identification is usually associated with
intense negative affect and countertransf erence
disruptions. Empathy, on the other hand, is often
associated with positive countertransference
:
The empathic experience ... as it is
traditionally defined, is characterized in the
therapist by feelings of harmony and closeness
with his patient, as well as by the experience
of positive self-regard for performing a job
well. (Tansey & Burke, 1989, p. 56)
An alternative view is presented by Tansey and
Burke. They argue that these concepts do not refer to
different realms of experience but that such a
distinction arose in part due to the theoretical
framework out of which each concept developed. The
concept of empathy was developed by ego psychologists and
is understood as an intrapsychic process within the
therapist, whereas projective identification grew out of
a relational perspective. They assert that there is "a
fundamental sameness between what is typically referred
to as the processing of a projective identification and
the objective scrutiny of an empathic trial
identification" (p. 63).
According to Tansey and Burke, both empathy and
projective identification involve projective activity by
the client:
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We propose that in the process of a therapist's
achieving empathic contact with his
patient, some degree of projective
identification from the patient is virtually
always involved
... (An ) empathic trial
Identification does not spring full blown inthe mind of a therapist. In addition to thetherapist's receptivity, the achievement of
empathic contact always involves the
interpersonal "sending power" of the patient
such that the induced trial identification is
the outcome of a radically mutual interactive
process
.
(p. 62)
Additionally, both empathy and projective
identification involve an identification on the part of
the therapist. This is consistent with others who view
empathy as based upon trial identifications. However,
like some others (Beres & Arlow, 1974; Deutsch, 1926;
Schafer, 1959), Tansey and Burke broaden empathy to
include complementary as well as concordant
identifications: the therapist identifies with the
patient's phantasied object representations as well as
with phantasized self representations (Sandler, 1987).
They concur with those who understand projective
identification to involve the client's interactional
pressure on the therapist to form an identification with
the projected contents.
Tansey and Burke's concern is not with a
metapsychological rearrangement of terms but with how
therapist's handle and utilize countertransf erence . They
see empathy and projective identification as interrelated
aspects of countertransf erence and feel that projective
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identification provides an important pathway to empathic
receptiveness that is often overlooked. They suggest
that empathy and projective identification have been
differentiated by four characteristics:
the intense versus mild impact on the
therapist, the intrapsychic versus
interpersonal nature of the process; pathology
versus normality; and the therapist's degree of
conscious control over versus unconscious
reactiveness to the experience, (p. 61)
Having recast empathy as more of an interpersonal
process than an intrapsychic one, they also question the
other distinctions drawn between empathy and projective
identification
:
In attempting to examine how a patient
communicates with a therapist and influences
him to respond in one way or another, the
decision about the degree of coerciveness
,
disruptiveness
,
intensity, or psychopathology
involved is essentially arbitrary. We have
concluded that much is to be gained from
recognizing the commonality between the easily,
quickly, and preconsciously processed 'flash'
experience of empathy and the much more
difficult, at times even tumultuous, processing
of an exceedingly uncomfortable projective
identification that involves considerable time
and conscious energy, (pp. 63-64)
Countertransference
For the purposes of this study countertransference
is viewed as the totality of the therapist's emotional
reactions to the client, and includes both the conscious
and unconscious reactions of the therapist; the "'real'
as well as the neurotically 'distorted'" (Tansey & Burke,
1989, p. 10). This "totalist" perspective contrasts with
a "classical" view of countertransference which defines
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countertransference as the therapist's pathological and
unconscious reaction to the client's transference.
Two factors motivate such an adherence to a totalist
view of countertransference. Foremost is the belief that
the therapeutic process involves a relationship between
two people, both of whom contribute to the emotional
climate which is created. According to Kernberg (1965),
A totalist concept of countertransference doesjustice to the conception of the analytic
situation as an interaction process in which
past and present of both participants, as well
as their mutual reactions to their past and
present fuse into a unique emotional position
involving both of them. (p. 41)
The second factor is the belief that
countertransference represents an extremely useful
investigatory tool into the client's emotional life. A
therapist's unconscious perception of a client, such
perception being manifested by countertransference
reactions, is potentially much more attuned to the
client's unconscious than a therapist's conscious
reasoning (Heimann, 1950; Reik, 1937). A classical view
of countertransference implies that such reactions are
wrong and to be overcome. Such a view fosters a "phobic
attitude" on the part of the therapist towards his own
emotional reactions, an attitude that limits
understanding the client.
When the analyst feels that his emotional
reaction is an important technical instrument
for understanding and helping the patient, the
analyst feels freer to face his positive and
negative emotions evoked in the transference
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situation, has less need to block these
reactions, and can utilize them for his
analytic work. (Kernberg, 1965, p. 40)
Considering countertransf erence reactions as useful
mitigates against the possibility that such reactions
will be acted upon or discharged out of a wish to not
acknowledge them.
Tansey and Burke (1989) argue that the once
intensely debated distinction between a classical and
totalist view has evolved to a generally held view that
the therapist's experience is "potentially-though not
necessarily useful" (p. 34). They suggest that the
convergence of these formally divergent views has
resulted from two factors: a more sophisticated
understanding of empathy as central to the therapeutic
process; and to the development of the concept of
projective identification and the role it plays in
psychotherapeutic change. New schools in psychoanalytic
theory that emphasized the interpersonal nature of the
therapeutic process as well as the increasing popularity
of an object relational framework facilitated both these
changes.
Tansey and Burke suggest that the classical-totalist
debate has evolved into an increasing focus upon
classifying the source of therapists' reactions. Whether
therapists should have reactions is debated less than how
to understand and use these reactions. Attempts exist to
classify the therapist's reactions along a continuum:
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therapists' reactions range from being a "reflection of
the patient's internal world and a response to the
interactional pressures" (p. 35) to reactions stimulated
in the patient's presence but which "emanate
predominantly from the therapist's essentially private
concerns" (p. 35). Lakovics (1983) offers one such
classification of the sources of countertransf erence
:
TOTAL
COUNTER-
TRANSFERENCE
Concordant
Identifi-
cation
SOURCE
Originates in
the patient but
is experienced
by the therapist
Comple-
mentary
Identifi-
cation
Inter-
actional
Reactions
Same
Originates from
the interaction
and personality
characteristics
of the therapist
TIME TREATMENT
Develops from If recog-
patient's pre- nized and
sent self
experience
understood
,
can be ex-
tremely use-
ful in treat
ment, if un-
recognized,
can become a
hindrance
.
Develops from Same
patient's past
experiences of
early objects.
Develops from
current here/
now exper-
iences of
therapy.
May be a hin
drance and
sometimes
useful de-
pending on
whether they
are under-
stood, incor
porated, and
used with
therapeutic
interven-
tions in
mind
.
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Life
Events
Originates from
the therapist's
life experiences
outside of
therapy
.
Institu-
tional
Counter-
transference
Develops from
current thera-
pist life
experiences
May be use-
ful or may
be a
hindrance
.
Classical Originates in
Counter- the therapist,
transference
Develops from Hindrance
therapists past
( neurotic
)
conflicts
.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Subjects
Interview subjects were ten students enrolled in the
Clinical Psychology Program at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst. All students seeing clients at
the training clinic within the psychology department were
contacted (see Appendix A) and invited to participate in
the study. Subjects were informed that the study would
investigate experiences with projective identification of
therapists- in- training and that familiarity with the
concept of projective identification was not necessary
for participation in the study. There was only one
criterion for participation: subjects should either
currently be in or have received psychodynamic
supervision in the past. It was emphasized that one's
chosen orientation need not be psychodynamic. This
criterion was established due to my assumption that
experiences with projective identification would be most
likely to occur and be noticed in treatments that were
non-directive
.
Of the approximately 20 students contacted, 15
responded. Of these 15, one declined to participate due
to lack of time. Three trainees were not invited to
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participate because they did not satisfy the criterion.
This left 11 respondents. The original number desired
for participation was 10 trainees with the hope that
these 10 would represent a range of experience. Since
only two men responded, the decision was made to
interview both men. A decision was made to eliminate one
respondent from the level of experience most heavily
represented. The eliminated respondent was randomly
chosen. The final 10 subjects represented the following
levels of experience: (1) 2 trainees with 3-4 years of
seeing clients; (2) 5 trainees with 2-3 years of seeing
clients; (1) 3 trainees with less than a year of seeing
clients. There were two men and 8 women. Of the 10
trainees interviewed, six considered their orientation to
be primarily psychodynamic ; one trainee combined
psychodynamic with a systems orientation, one with
behaviorism. Four trainees expressed that they either
did not have an orientation or were still finding one.
Many of the ideas in this thesis are explored along
developmental lines. The pseudonyms and levels of
experience of the interview subjects are as follows:
3-4 years of 2-3 years of less than one
experience experience year of
Rebecca Wendy experience
Sharon Sara Dorothy
Michael Peter
Jane Isadora
Elizabeth
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Setting
The Psychological Services Center (PSC) is the
training clinic run by the Clinical Psychology Program at
the University of Massachusetts. The program offers
exposure to psychodynamic
, behavioral and family systems
orientations and PSC teams reflect one of these three
orientations or a blending within a more eclectic
framework. Teams are composed of one faculty member, a
teaching assistant, (T.A.), who is an advanced trainee,
and five to seven trainees. Trainees usually carry a
caseload of three clients and receive an hour of
supervision a week from both the faculty leader and the
T.A. Additionally, most teams utilize peer supervision
within a case presentation format.
PSC participation is required the first two years of
training and is optional thereafter; many advance
trainees opt to continue with ongoing clients in long
term treatment. Trainees start seeing clients either the
summer after their first year or the beginning of their
second year. During the first year participation on
teams consists of observation of therapy sessions and
team discussions.
Interview
The interview was semi-structured in format (see
Appendix B). Interview questions were aimed at eliciting
discussion of two types of clinical experiences: (1)
those involving strong emotions on the part of the
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therapist; (2) those where the therapist had experience
him/herself in a similar way to how their clients
experienced themselves. This approach was taken to
explore clinical experiences which might have involved
projective identification but were not defined as such.
The last part of the interview asked directly about
experiences with projective identification.
The interviews took place in March and April of
1988. Most interviews lasted approximately one and one
half hours. The interviews with the two most advanced
trainees lasted two and one half hours. Participants
were assured of their confidentiality and that of their
clients and were asked to sign an informed consent
( Appendix C )
.
Analysis of Data
My first step in the data analysis was to make
verbatim transcripts of each interview. I then spent
several weeks familiarizing myself with these transcripts
by reading and rereading them. It became evident that
trainees experiences with projective identification were
not clearly distinguished from experiences with empathy
and other sources of counter- transference . Additionally,
important themes related to the general process of
learning psychotherapy emerged from my initial analysis
of the data. These themes included: (1) The
differentiation of the origin of affect; (2) Issues about
empathy and the loss of boundaries; (3) Trainees own
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experiences in therapy or personal growth apart from
therapy; (4) Identifying with clients; and (5) Reactions
to how emotionally involving clinical work was.
At this point in the analysis the experiences of
these trainees gave a vivid picture of some components of
clinical training but there was no framework for the
discussion. I decided to return to the literature to
search for a more comprehensive understanding of what it
was that I was looking at. I immersed myself in the
literature on empathy. I found particularly helpful
analyses of the communication of affect in the clinical
setting and discussions of how therapists use their own
emotional reactions. In reading the literature on
psychotherapy training, I realized much of the data
illuminated issues related to trainees' developing
abilities to use their inner experience in understanding
their clients. The final organization of the data
examines how trainees learn an empathic use of self in
their clinical work. While I have developed a
theoretical framework to understand my interview data, I
have presented the data in such a way that allows the
subjects to speak for themselves and invites the reader
to interact with the trainees' words and thoughts.
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CHAPTER III
THE THERAPEUTIC USE OF SELF
Introduction
The concepts of countertransf erence
,
empathy and
projective identification provide a foundation for
exploring the meaning of a therapist's inner subjective
experience. Attunement to one's inner experience is
considered by some to be their most reliable source of
data about a client: it is a widely held belief that
"the experience of the therapist while he is in
interaction with the patient plays a central role in
psychoanalytic understanding of the therapeutic process"
(Berger, 1987, p. 39).
The examination of one's own inner experience to
understand a client's involves the therapeutic use of
one's personality: the use of one's self. A therapist's
use of herself as an "instrument to observe the
psychological life" (Basch, 1983b) of her patient is the
main instrument of investigation in psychoanalytically
informed psychotherapy. A therapist's affective
responses, fantasies, associations and somatic
experiences (Thompson, 1980) are all means for
understanding what is being communicated by one's
patient. While it is an empathic "use of self" that is
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Widely considered to be the essence of the psychodynarnic
therapist's role (Goldberg, 1984; Berger, 1987), the
receiving and processing of clients' projective
identifications has also been considered by some to be
part of an empathic use of self (Tansey & Burke, 1989).
In part, a therapist's use of self involves entering
into the emotional world of the client: a critical aspect
of the use of self is "a willingness to be exposed to the
emotional climate generated by the client and the threat
of change this entails" (Goldberg, 1984, p. 35).
Additionally however, a therapeutic use of self consists
of alternating between such emotional involvement and a
reflection upon what this emotional experience means.
Descriptions of this process are found in Sullivan's
discussion of the term, "participant-observer"; the
oscillation between the observing and experiencing parts
of the therapist's ego (Jarmon, in press, Schafer, 1959);
and the observing and experiencing functions of the
therapist's work ego (Olinick, 1973). In an early
writing, Deutsch (1926) maintained that a therapist had
to master both positions of being an observer and a
participant in order to oscillate between emotional
involvement and distant objectivity. Reik (1937)
asserted that as a participant in the emotional
interchange the therapist is a part of what is observed.
Goldberg (1984) emphasized that the therapist must enter
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the client's world but then return to her own self to
maintain the clinical perspective required for effective
intervention
.
The importance of this balance is illuminated by the
comments of an advanced trainee. Sharon's comments
illustrate why it is not enough to participate in the
client's experience without reflecting on its meaning.
I think it could become empathy if i wanted tolet it happen that way, I mean if I wanted-I
think it becomes empathy when you put
consciousness into what's happened to you. You
can lose yourself and become disorganized by
what somebody is doing to you without it being
empathic, it only becomes empathic when you
recognize what the feelings are in relation to
that person and that these feelings that you're
having are like them... You could imagine two
hysterical people together, and how they could
get themselves worked up to tizzy-not therapist
and client, but like they're firing off of each
other. They're catalysts, but they are not
necessarily empathizing. They're definitely
mushing boundaries. But a therapist and
client, I could imagine having a hysterical
client and sort of getting caught up in that
upward spiral and that swirl and at the same
time keeping an eye on it and saying: 'Oh, this
is a little breathless, this is what that feels
like, this must be what it felt like to her
when she had to take her driver's test, it felt
like this!' That's when it becomes empathy.
To learn to be an effective participant-observer in
the clinical interaction is an arduous developmental
process and represents a "complex, cognitive and
affective achievement" (Goldberg, 1984, p. 145).
Trainees must learn first that their internal experience
is a potential source of information and not to be
feared or eliminated. Exposing oneself to the emotional
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climate generated by a client can be a threatening
adventure for many reasons, some of which will be
highlighted throughout this thesis. it is especially
threatening before one learns that one's inner experience
is an important part of the therapeutic encounter.
This chapter will explore the experiences of
therapists-in-training in learning to become participant-
observers in the clinical encounter. it will explore
first how trainees react to realizing that the work
involves such intense emotional participation. Learning
to observe what is experienced will be explored in the
section on the observing self.
The Literature on the Development of a Therapeutic Use ofSelf "
Given the centrality of the use of self in the
clinical encounter, surprisingly little is written about
the development of this ability in therapists- in-
training. Although much of the literature explicates a
therapist's use of self in its empathic and analyzing
functions, little is said about the developmental
vicissitudes of learning to use one's internal responses
as an instrument of therapeutic investigation and
understanding.
In an interview study conducted on supervisors and
therapists-in-training, Ralph (1980) suggests that
therapists progress through the following four
-lestones" in learning to be therapists:mi
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a'non^?^ psychotherapist asdirective expert.
c^oh^i''^
a EaUent:icentered approach that isgl bal patient-centered, and concretely
content-centered.
3) A relationship-centered approach thatinvolves the discovery of psychotherapy asan interpersonal process.
4) The development of a therapist-npntor-oH
approach in which there is increasing
awareness of the usefulness as well as thelimitations that the therapist's ownfeelings impose.
The therapeutic use of self could be seen as
corresponding to the last stage in this developmental
scheme. Ralph suggests that understanding that one's
affective and cognitive responses are clinically useful
represents the highest developmental achievement of a
"therapist centered" approach. He says this learning is
facilitated when trainees have a conceptual understanding
of why their feelings and reactions are useful. This
developmental step is achieved when a therapist learns to
trust her reactions as a "source of information rather
than as an unwanted and anxiety provoking intrusion"
(p. 246). The comments by Sara, a trainee in her 3rd
year, underscore the developmental nature of this
achievement. She bemoaned how she still felt unable to
use her inner experience.
Will I ever? I think that's a weakness. I
don't use my feelings enough. Sometimes it's
easier not to. I think I'm just learning now
to notice myself in the therapy room, instead
of just focussing on the client. I'm just
starting to notice what's going on with me at
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the time. Which for the first year I didn't dohardly ever. And didn't want to either!
Sara's comments also illustrate Ralph's assertion that
"for many students the ability to use their own feelings
reactions and intuitions in a more spontaneous way is
connected with being more comfortable in the role of
therapist" ( p . 247 ) .
The third milestone identified by Ralph lays the
foundation for understanding the importance of one's
inner experience.-
A third conceptual milestone for trainees is
the discovery of what is perhaps the core ofdynamically oriented psychotherapy-
psychotherapy as an interpersonal process
involving the feelings and reactions of both
therapist and patient. It represents a
movement from a more concrete approach that
focuses on the content of the hour, what the
patient said and did, to a relationship -
centered approach that focuses on the
metacontent of the hour-that is, the feelings
and emotions developed in the patient- therapist
relationship which generated that content,
(p. 246)
Therapists in training must learn that their inner
experience is a source of information about their
client. They must learn to attend to and use their
emotional reactions in the service of understanding thei
clients.
Sharaf and Levinson (1964) describe some
developmental difficulties that are inherent in the
therapeutic use of self. They propose that clinical
training is characterized by a quest for omnipotence.
Given that therapists-in-training are individuals with
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the highly developed intellectual abilities necessary to
enter competitive training programs, trainees must now
develop their emotional sides and become more open to the
experiential aspect of clinical involvement. In
describing the change from valuing intellectual insight
and conceptual knowledge to valuing an emotional way of
knowing, they say that therapists-in-training, in their
quest for omnipotence, move from a desire for omniscience
to a desire for "omnisentience . " They suggest that
trainees, "new to the world of affective interchange" in
the clinical setting, long for the apparent
"omnisentience" of more experienced practitioners who
demonstrate an "emotional elasticity" and "range of gut
responses .
"
Marguelis (1984) elaborates on the issue that
therapists-in-training, having succeeded at intellectual
accomplishments, must now learn to value emotional
involvement. In reflecting upon his own seminal training
experiences, he recalls how he was challenged to "put
aside his knowledge" in order to learn to listen to
patients. As an experienced and senior clinician, he has
grown to appreciate a supervisor's admonition that
knowledge not be used defensively against the pain that
"could not be borne" (p. 1031). He recalls that his
supervisor questioned whether he and his highly
intellectually accomplished peers "could stand to listen"
(p. 1031) to their patients.
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Changing from an intellectual to the experience near
approach necessary in the clinical endeavor requires that
one be able to tolerate uncertainty. Bion (1959) writes
of the importance of not knowing to allow for the
emergence of the not yet known. m order for both
therapist and client to learn about the client, the
therapist must tolerate uncertainty and the anxiety from
"forestalling closure" (Goldberg, 1984) on what is
understood about the patient's experience. Thompson
(1980) borrows from Winnicott (1971) and stresses that
the ability to use one's inner experience is enhanced by
an ability to sit with "muddle." Not knowing and sitting
with muddle often have to be learned by therapists- in-
training
.
A therapeutic use of self demands an emotional
involvement that can challenge experienced clinicians.
As beginning therapists, the scariness, intensity and
demands of such emotional involvement is that much more
challenging: therapists-in-training are still developing
the skills needed to make use of this involvement.
Before trainees gain appreciation that their inner
experience is useful, emotional involvement is seen as
even more problematic. As we turn to the experiences of
therapists in training, we will see therapists grappling
with the emotional demands of the work in learning the
use of self.
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of the Wnr V
The emotional intensity of the work came as a
surprise to virtually every therapist- in- training
interviewed. Throughout the interviews trainees
described how challenging and emotionally demanding
clinical training is. Therapists spoke often of feeling
affectively overwhelmed and of doubting themselves. For
instance, Dorothy conveyed her surprise that the work was
so emotionally intense. Her views of her early
experiences are colored by her work with Tina, a
borderline client, with whom the work was especially
evocative
:
I never really expected to feel any of these
kinds of-it's like being on a roller coaster.
That's what it feels like a lot of times. Ididn't expect that at all. None of it. So
this is all somewhat unusual in terms of what I
would have predicted a priori...! didn't think
that it would have that depth...! don't feel
out of control any more but at the beginning-
kind of out of control or just so unaware-not
in the sense of crazy out of control but so
unaware of what's going on-like 'What the fuck
is this? ! don't understand this!
One of Dorothy's reactions was to question whether
she could handle the work. She described having
fantasies of saying "Uncle, I've had enough, ! didn't
want to do this anyway!" Looking back on these times
Dorothy felt:
It's scary to think that I could have had those
feelings; that I just wanted to quit; that I
just didn't want to do this... It was scary to
see that I could just fall apart like that. Or
move to the fantasy of saying 'I just have to
get out of-just throwing my books down and
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Jhan"? h.h'h^"'" was in for moret I ad bargained for... So that's why it'sscary-can I do it?
Early in her training Dorothy had been shaken from
receiving her client's projective identifications.
Unable to identify how she could be made to feel so
intensely, Dorothy felt out of control. She
characterized herself as experiencing extreme emotions:
But the scariest one was-well I think all ofthem combined on a bad day that it would be so
overwhelming that I would think about
quitting: 'I made a mistake; I shouldn't do
this; see, I can't do this-I get so involved init!' That was the scariest part of it all...
I
would be so fucking angry. Or just so fucking
confused. Extreme forms of emotions.
While much of Dorothy's reaction reflects her
experiences with Tina, she feels that doing psychodynamic
therapy requires a greater emotional involvement than she
expected. She contrasted her training experiences with
previous work:
I think just the nature of this kind of
therapy. In behavioral therapy I would have
never gotten involved in these kinds of
issues ... Because it's really getting into some
of the deep issues, it requires the person
really being deep and I think you have to dig
in deeper than that. It's not something that I
knew was going to happen...! think it's
draining. I think it's given me an
appreciation for how difficult it is for people
to go through some of these things.
Peter also recounted feeling that he just could not
tolerate how anxious he had sometimes felt in the
beginning. He recounted with amusement his reaction
before seeing a client who had ragefully stormed out of
their previous session.
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lln.t t ^ ^^^^^ had anything
th?S I'^ ^ ^ ^^1^ 'I can'? do
noJ h
leaving-i'm going to Brazil! I cant be in the room with this woman for 50minutes. I was shaking. i had heard about
beJore^^""^ ""^^^ ^^'"^ close to it
Can One Be Competent if the Work so Emotinn.17
^^''^^^ arose not only about tolerating the intensity
of the work but also about what it meant that one was so
reactive. These doubts seemed to arise because of lack
of recognition that one's emotional responses are useful
and integral to the work. One expression that these
concerns took was whether one could be competent given
the intensity of the reactions. Elizabeth was one of
several therapists who questioned this. She described
her reaction to a number of affectively laden sessions:
I've felt sometimes after a session just very
full of emotion, sometimes able to identify
them, sometimes not. In a way that I'm not
use to feeling after a session. It happened
several times in a row. Having it happen to
that extent was strange, and a little
disturbing: 'How am I going to be a good
therapist if after a session I feel like
this?
'
Peter expressed a similar concern upon his
realization that clinical work was so emotionally
evocative. He thought this made it more complicated than
he had originally envisioned. In response, Peter felt:
Incompetent. It seems like it's really hard to
do-almost impossible. On one hand I thought:
'Ok, this is hard stuff, it's going to take a
long time and a lot of work to be good at
this'... But on the other hand wondering if it's
a challenge that's just too big and wondering
if I was ever going to get good at it.
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Weakness
'
""^"^^""'^"^
^^^r. As InHi...Sn, .......
^
Another form that self doubt seemed to take was in
therapists' concerns that their emotional reactivity
indicated personal weaknesses or psychological problems
that made them unsuited to the work. For instance,
Dorothy felt that
it was such a weakness that I could be feelingthis way. Like god, I thought I was strongerthan this; I should be able to take this more.
Sharon was another therapist who experienced her
reactivity as diagnostic that she was unsuited to the
work. Like Dorothy, she had worked with a disturbed
client early in training and found herself experiencing
her client's "craziness." Consequently, she had
sustained similar feelings of surprise, fear and self
doubt
:
I was initially frightened by it, and I thought
it meant that I was crazy, and that it meant
that I was a bad-that I shouldn't be a
therapist because I could be so easily swayed
by the wind in the room... It's a useful tool to
let that happen to you-it took me longer to
realize it as that rather than simply
understanding what was going on. That interim
phase was when I was still a little thrown by
the fact that I was so vulnerable to it. Also
medical school syndrome: That I had everything
in the book and here was proof. . .Yeh, it made
me feel like I was crazy, or that there was
barely concealed craziness. But I look at that
now differently too. I'm not so sure that
that's wrong, but I think it's fairly true of
everyone. And it just depends on how strong
the defense systems are. So I'm not as
threatened by the fact that that might be true
as I used to be... (But) what I felt at that
time was that I was indeed crazy; I had been
hiding it from everybody and had a great front.
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fr-Lt ?^ ^''^ ^^i^^t t° P^ove that myon was useless! I wasn't sure if I wasborderline or what, but I knew it was way downdevelopmentally
!
Sharon alluded to how letting herself be affected by
the emotional climate in the room, or in her words,
letting herself be swayed by the wind in the room, is a
useful tool. She did not yet feel that she has it under
her control to the degree that she would like.
In contrast, Rebecca, the most advanced therapist
interviewed, had grown to be more comfortable with the
emotional intensity of the work. She felt that working
with countertransference was one of the most interesting
aspects of the work and articulated clearly her
developmental process with learning to use her self in
the room. She said in the beginning she had been
"buffeted" by having countertransference reactions that
she had not known how to understand or use. Like other
trainees, the beginning period had engendered
considerable distress. She summarized her process of
learning to tolerate the emotional intensity of the work:
Starting off just feeling all these things,
even in the beginning not even being aware of
them except to feel some discomfort or to just
feel bad about myself for having those kinds of
feelings. Giving me all sorts of self doubts
about "Can I do this work because I'm so
reactive?" Having to go home and think about
clients, thinking I don't want to have to take
these problems home with me. So starting off
it feels like a really hard kind of thing... It
made me wonder if I wanted to do this kind of
work, basically. Because, it was early enough
that I didn't know this was part of the work:
'Maybe there was something wrong with me-roaybe
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I m not cut out for this. Because I don'tthink this happens to everybody because look at
n>e; I n, crawling into bed-Therapists don't
usually do this. I've known therapists who
seemed a lot more at ease.' So I would doubt
myself and my ability, thinking it was more myproblem rather than it was an inherent part ofthe work. Within that step would be: 'God
maybe this is. part of the work! Do I want todo it?! It's happening every time! And it
seems like some other people around me aredoing this too! Ahh!' (Then) came this kind
of resignation: 'This is part of it.' Butlet me think. It took a long time until I
could almost not care about having
feelings.
. .So going through: like at first, not
wanting to have these feelings, then
resignation that part of being a therapist
means having strong feelings, then there was a
lot of judgements on those feelings, like 'Oh
my god, I'm hating my client', maybe this is
saying so and so about my client but it's also
saying I have this-I don't want to know that or
it forced me to look at myself and-ooh, I don't
want to know that I have this.' Then there was
a real excitement, like 'Ooh, I had this
countertransf erence reaction', or 'Oh, I can
have this range of feelings'; this sort of
high on myself about it. It was really
exciting to feel something really strongly and
even more exciting to be able to do something
with it. And then it's sort of developed into
this 'all in a day's work' kind of attitude.
Like I don't feel the same kind of guilt I used
to feel when I'd get angry, or feel like it was
wrong or right in this major excited way.
There's just a lot more tolerance and
acceptance. It's not like it's a blah now,
because that has a negative connotation. But
just an acceptance that the same way that a
carpenter uses a saw, this is what I use. And
I don't go home with this stuff anymore.
Except when things are very intense.
Mourning The Realization That The Work Is So
Involving
Rebecca's summary highlights additional issues in
learning that clinical work is so emotionally evocative.
She felt ambivalent that emotional involvement is part of
the work because she feared that being a therapist would
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mean being emotionally overwhelmed much of the time. She
questioned whether she wanted to be a therapist, followed
by an almost depressive resignation to the realization
that clinical work involves such a use of self.
Dorothy also expressed a type of mourning upon her
realization that clinical work is so emotionally
evocative. At first she resisted her emerging
understanding that how she felt was an inherent part of
the work:
But I guess the other thing that bothered me
was: 'Do I have to do this in order for it to
work? Is this a necessary requirement?' Going
through all of that-'Isn't there another way.'
So I guess there was kind of a depression and
frustration and a bunch of different things
combined: 'This is self torture!'
Like Rebecca, Dorothy has come to understand that
her emotional responsiveness is a clinical "tool," but
she remains ambivalent that her emotional involvement is
necessary. Her appreciation of this necessity helps her
to remain open despite occasional desires to not feel her
clients' pain. She said:
You've got to open yourself to those types of
things or it's not going to effective. So on
a shitty day you can't think 'I don't want to
feel ambivalent, I don't want to feel angry, I
just want an easy day!' Because then you're
not going to get anything done.
Michael also spoke of his ambivalence:
It's complicated because there's still some
lingering feeling of I don't want to feel these
things so maybe I don't want to be a
therapist. It's mixed. Because the feelings
can be quite painful... I think part and parcel
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of this work is not to control what I'm feelinq-I mean certa nly not to the extreme, but I
^ntn n,
^""^ possible for me to goi o most sessions and cut off my feelinosaltogether. But I wouldn't be doi^g very goodwork. So part of the way I understand i^ Isletting myself feel it and that may be painful.
Wendy also spoke of sometimes having to make an
effort to be open to feeling. Even outside her clinical
work she often feels out of touch with her own feelings
and admitted that
One of the reasons I wanted to do psychodynamic
work was because of the emphasis on my feelings
as part of the work-so for no other reason I
would have to figure out what I feel.
She also struggles to remain in touch and connected with
clients at times when she might prefer not to feel.
Sometimes it's an effort on my part to be open
to the person-where I need to consciously make
an effort to be open. And then I can feel
that. Then I'm open to feeling those
feelings. But other times I've noticed that
I'm closed-either because I'm feeling shitty,
and when I feel shitty-I don't feel like
connecting with people. And I've noticed that
happening in therapy, where I've just not made
as much effort to be there-and my questions are
different, my interactions are different and I
feel less empathic. And other times when I'm
feeling differently, and feeling more like
connecting, I can feel bad in a session but I
feel like I'm much more there with the person
in a different way. And I don't know-I don't
really understand it very well. But it has to
do with having an openness to that connection
so be willing to feel maybe in some ways it has
to do with that. And I don't always want to
feel I think.
Finding A Balance
Dorothy and Michael are both struggling to find a
balance with how involved they allow themselves to get in
the emotional climate of therapy. In their ambivalence
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about feeling their clients' pain, they know they risk
maintaining too much interpersonal distance to develop an
emotional understanding of their clients. They worry
that their motivation is one of self protecti
Sharon also questioned what it meant that she
less receptive to entering the emotional climate in the
room than she had been in the beginning. Like Dorothy,
she had been overwhelmed in the beginning. m time she
realized that she "could pull (her)self together and go
on with (her) life" and "came to understand that it
wasn't as terrifying as it seemed to be at first." Like
Rebecca and Dorothy, Sharon came to see the affective
intensity as part of the work and to feel less
overwhelmed. However, Sharon did not share Rebecca's
confidence that her ability to tolerate the intensity was
entirely positive. She feared it was defensive:
I might be less responsive to it now-I would
have the capability to be less responsive ... I '
m
not sure it's good. I feel like I've become
much more inured to what we're doing. And I'm
not sure that I'm all there in the way that I
was in the beginning: Body and soul, heart and
mind. I'm not nearly as present.
Interviewer: I would imagine that you have
developed the capacity to turn it off and on
with greater facility.
Sharon: Right, but I might keep it off more
than I should. I'm just speculating...! would
say that for me that issue of being open to it
or not is really where my work as a therapist
is right now. At the end of a session, or when
I'm reviewing a transcript or in supervision,
the degree to which I allowed myself to feel
what they were or weren't feeling is what I
tend to focus on... what I'm trying to do is be
aware of my feelings.
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Perhaps Sharon's susceptibility to "being swayed by
the wind in the room" motivates her to "keep it off more
than (she) should." At this point in her clinical
development she focuses on trying to be open to the
affect without becoming overwhelmed. in the beginning
this balance seemed impossible:
I was just scared that I was going to be on a
roller coaster; that this profession was justgoing to be hair raising. I mean it's onething to have a nutty client-it's another thingif you have 4 suicidal clients. Who wants tobe feeling suicidal times 4. You know?
Sharon's emphasis on remaining open to her feelings
suggests a belief that this is a necessary component of
effective clinical work. Sharon would agree with
Rebecca's assessment that her ability to emotionally
resonate with her clients is a "tool, like a carpenter's
saw . "
Perhaps Sharon, Michael and Dorothy are being
defensive in their desire to not feel and are distancing
themselves from emotional interactions. Perhaps they are
taking too distant a stance and are unwilling to become
involved out of fear of their feelings. However, a
balance between participating and keeping one's emotional
distance in order to make use of what one experiences is
necessary for effective clinical work. Perhaps they are
developing the skills to become effective participant-
observers, thereby not becoming so enmeshed that they
lose their ability to reflect on the process. As will be
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discussed shortly, part of the necessary skills is the
ability to switch to the position of the observing self.
Elizabeth's comments suggest that at times she finds that
balance
:
I can feel with them if I'm really with them.Those feelings come together and I'm just
really there. It doesn't mean I can't think
about the process at the same time, but kind ofnot backing away from feeling, or at least nottoo much. I mean I don't want to get totally
absorbed in their emotions because then I
wouldn't be helpful either.
Giving Up Control
Another concern that emerged in the interviews about
being emotionally involved with one's clients were
feelings about giving up control. Comments by Dorothy
illustrate that part of her difficulty had been that she
had felt out of control of the process. In response to
how she experiences herself in the room Dorothy said:
I feel much more vulnerable ... It ' s kind of
scary to not know where these things are coming
from sometimes. To question what the fuck is
going on here, as opposed to a style where
you're much more confrontive and in a sense,
much more controlling of the particular
emotions and the directions that things are
going to go in. Basically the client is doing
that in this type of therapy; the client is
doing that so you're going along with the flow.
Feeling vulnerable meant not knowing what she was going
to be made to feel. Dorothy had to learn to give up
control and to willingly follow where her clients took
her
.
Isadora also struggled with giving up control and
feeling vulnerable. In response to a question about
56
identifying with or feeling like her client, Isadora
said
;
L!""?!"^ ^V^"" "'^'^^ ^ positive thing andsomething I would like more of. But at thesame time it's a little risky and scary butIt s worth It to me.
Interviewer: What's scary or risky about it^Isadora: Well, it's out of control. It's more
vulnerable. Because you're less certain- less
certain about where your feelings will gi-you're more involved and less removed.
Dorothy dealt with her anxiety during this initial
period by trying to maintain control of the process.
Over time she has grown more comfortable and has learned
to accept the emotional impact of being with her
clients. She has seen this change most dramatically in
her work with Tina:
Probably in the third session with Tina, I went
in ready to defend myself, just really feeling
shut down: 'I'm not going to let her do this to
me, I'm going to be in control '
-that kind of
stuff. Now, I've just learned to relax before
I go in and say 'She's going to bring in what
she brings in and it's stuff I need to see and
it's stuff we need to talk about.' So I just
have a different attitude about it now. Not
that she's trying to harm me, she's trying to
get me to help her.
Dorothy's struggle to tolerate the intensity of the
work emanated primarily from her work with Tina. Perhaps
Dorothy's work with a disturbed client so early in
training sensitized her to issues of intense affect. In
developing a recognition that Tina's intense impact was
her way of dramatizing her need for help, Dorothy has
learned that her internal responses are helpful and not
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something to be feared. According to Tansey and Burke
(1989), there are some clients, and perhaps Tina is one,
with whom even experienced clinicians would be challenged
in their ability to manage the feelings aroused in the
work. They state:
It is sometimes with great effort that thetherapist is able to maintain, if not
neutrality, at least equanimity in the face ofinteractional pressure,
(p. 104)
As a beginner, Dorothy was doubly challenged. As
Brightman (1984) says:
Feelings of helplessness and/or fears of loss
of control (in both trainees and patients) can
mobilize strivings after an ironclad sense of
total control over the clinical field in order
to dispel the attendant anxiety, (p. 299)
Judging Oneself
Participating in the emotional climate of clinical
work involves confronting one's beliefs about the meaning
of the feelings that are aroused. One component of
meaning has been illustrated by what trainees thought the
feelings illuminated about themselves. For instance,
Rebecca and Dorothy thought the feelings indicated
personal weakness and Sharon thought the feelings
indicated she was crazy. An additional level of meaning
entails one's judgements about the goodness or badness of
specific feelings; part of tolerating the affect is not
being constrained by beliefs about the unacceptabi lity of
certain feelings. Rebecca spoke of arriving at the
58
position where her feelings conveyed in£or,nation and she
no longer felt compelled to judge herself for having
them
.
It took a long time until I could almost notcare about having feelings. Which sounds so
weird, but that's where I feel I'm getting to
now. I notice this from conversations with
other people-'so what if you hate that, so what
If. That seems like a very important place toget. It's not as cold as it sounds
Interviewer: Almost like they are information
as opposed to being truth in themselves?
Rebecca: Yeh, and that it doesn't say anything
about-not that it doesn't say anything about mebut that it isn't a judgement call. Which for
a while it felt that way.
This took a while in her training:
I also think I was more closed out of
uncertainty and embarrassment-not wanting my
supervisor to know or not wanting me to know.
Now I don't care-or not that I don't care but
that it's a good sign. Just as I've learned
that it's not only ok but that's what it is. Ijust sort of let myself experience things.
Rebecca's openness results in part from the value
that she places upon understanding her counter-
transference :
I also think I'm prone to countertransf erence
reactions because I think that that's a good
thing to have. So as long as I think that I
kind of give myself permission to look for
them. Because I think I can make use of them.
According to her, Rebecca works primarily within a
transference-countertransf erence paradigm. She accepts
the emotional impact upon her because she wants to make
use of her internal response as a clinical tool.
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The^lntersection of the Work with On.^c p^jyat. r.ots....
Before turning to the topic of the observing self, a
final consideration is relevant to how trainees grapple
with the emotional intensity of the work; namely, how the
emotional demands of clinical work intersect with
trainees private emotional lives and/or their experiences
in therapy. It is a partially held belief in the field
that therapists should have been in treatment
themselves. If therapists must learn to use their
feelings clinically, than a therapist's familiarity with
her own emotional life is important. Therapists need to
be familiar with their internal conflicts and problems in
relationships and should be able to tolerate a wide range
of affect. There were no questions in the interview
about trainees's receiving therapy but information was
volunteered by four out of the 10 therapists-in-
training .
Everyone who talked about the intersection of their
clinical development with their own therapy described how
therapy had been helpful for their clinical work. Three
trainees spoke of therapy as helping them become more
open. Rebecca described becoming comfortable with how
emotionally evocative the work is and said that therapy
was part of her process of becoming more open to
feelings:
I think I've gotten more and more open as
time's gone on. I started out much less open,
partly-some of that coincides with my own
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therapy and what's become more available toof myself, can now be touched on by otherpeople. ^ v-'uiici
me
Michael and Isadora also spoke of their own therapy
as helping them become more open, especially at times of
experiencing themselves as similar to their clients in
ways that might feel uncomfortable or anxiety provoking.
Isadora valued these experiences:
I value it and I trust it more that it's ok andIt s not going to lead me someplace I can'thandle. It's a value system too. To sort of
explore to the depths of what you can know
about yourself and thereby enrich your life.
Not just live in the mundane.
Another helpful aspect of being in therapy was
expressed by Isadora and Elizabeth who talked about their
own therapy in the context of how their own emotional
struggles contributed to their ability to understand and
empathize with their clients. Isadora said:
Like when my client questions do I understand
her. She says I think you can sympathize but
you can't empathize. And I guess I think
because I've struggled through a lot-that is
the root of my empathy, even though it may not
be these exact issues, I've done a lot of work
and that's hard and I think I know what the
pain is of this kind of work. And that comes
from therapy but it comes from just living
too
.
Elizabeth expressed similar thoughts in the context
of having had a very difficult year emotionally:
I'm having to face my own feelings in a way
that I never used to. Through all of this (an
emotional crisis) and my own work in therapy.
I'm letting myself feel more than I used to and
that certainly has an impact in therapy. In
terms of being able to feel with a client. And
I think that that's going to stay. I mean my
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experiences where I've gone through certain
i^norr '^"^ ^'^^ ^ ^hi'^J^ ^he moremp tant one is my ability to really be there
feel iV.l'T ^""^ ^^1°^ myself ^othem when it's appropriate to.
Elizabeth and Isadora were both talking about
general life experiences rather than therapy itself.
Elizabeth spoke of the difference her own emotional work
has made in her clinical work:
I'm able to understand a lot more now than I
ever did all the things my clients go
through. There was something that I could bethere with them and hear but I was very removed-
I was really there with my clients first yearbut not really emotionally involved. I wouldhave strong emotion because I screwed up,
rather than because there was a strong feeling
together, although that happened sometimes
too. This year I've been much more connected
at a very emotional level.
Elizabeth sometimes experienced difficulty keeping
her own emotional work separate from her clinical work.
Despite these problems, Elizabeth recognized the positive
impact on her development in that her emotional
vulnerability made her pay closer attention to her
responses in the room:
I think that most of it was from just knowing
that I've got a responsibility to these people
and no matter what I'm going through I've got
to work it out in a way that I can be effective
with my clients and not let this get in the way
with them. Whenever I would have a reaction in
therapy or after or whatever-something about a
client that I didn't understand to a level that
I was comfortable with-then it was kind of a
crisis-oh no, what's happening, I have to
understand this, something's going on here and
I would talk about it in my own therapy or my
supervisor and I would ponder over it, and
through that process it's gotten more important
in general aside from when it's a big problem.
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Elizabeth admitted that it was very confusing to be
reaching the point in her development as a therapist
where she is beginning to pay attention to her feelings
in the therapeutic encounter at such a tumultuous time in
her own emotional life. But it is exciting as well:
"This year has been a powerhouse for my therapy."
It has been a "powerhouse" for Elizabeth's use of
herself as a therapist because her own experience in
therapy have given her access to her feelings, and
difficult emotional times have made it even more
imperative that she understand her inner experience as a
clinician
.
It is seen in these comments that becoming more
comfortable with affective responsiveness involves
learning that it is not a negative reflection on oneself
to have feelings and that such feelings are part of the
work. A conceptual understanding of countertransf erence
and how feelings are useful helps; additional under-
standings based on other sources will be explored in
later chapters. The next section will identify another
crucial input: the role of supervision in directing
trainees attention to their own reactions and what can be
learned from these reactions. We turn to the topic of
the observing self and the importance of the balance
between experiencing and thinking about that experience.
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The Ob serving <=^Pif
Few therapists-in-training actually referred to an
observing self; however, in virtually every interview
there were references to experiences which suggested an
inchoate understanding of a dividing line between an
experiencing self and an observing self. For instance,
Isadora could not identify how her client pulls for her
to be mothering but she could observe herself behaving in
such a way. And Peter felt that "a lot of the time I get
so sucked into the interaction that I stop thinking about
it as I should be as the therapist." The awareness of a
duality emerged most clearly from Sharon:
What I want to be able to do as a therapist is
be able to be in two places at once. I want to
be able to be in them-or have them in me, and
understand what's going on; and I also want to
be able to be a fly on the wall and keep a sort
of working observer that can interrupt it or
slow it down or head it in a different
direction or whatever, in order to be most
helpful. I'm not good at that yet. What I
tend to do-it's like there's two different
puddles and I tend to jump back and forth
between them-I'm either the fly on the wall or
I'm lost in their stuff. I think that working
those two simultaneously is what makes
therapists good therapists.
In her description of jumping between two puddles, Sharon
says that her experience of this duality is not one of
integration but is an either-or position. I think
perhaps in her work Sharon actually operates from a more
integrated position than her account suggests. In fact,
in her reflections on how she might work differently as a
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more advanced therapist with Karen, the client who had
made her feel so crazy, she expressed her growing
awareness of the possibility of integrating these two
positions
:
I think that she didn't see me as a discretebounded person. Who she was just kind offilled up the whole room and incorporated meinto It. I think I had a choice, I think I
could have put a wall around myself, could havepushed myself back away from it, and maybe I
would do that to a greater degree now, or more
selectively now as a therapist, but this wasbrand new to me. I was eager to do it right
and to be there with her. So I just fell into
It, time after time... (Now) I think I would be
much better able to observe what she was doing
and how what she was doing was having an impact
on me without losing my sense of my observing
self. What would happen to me would be that I
would lose my sense of the observing self-I
would have no consciousness of time, I was
caught up in her world.
In describing the "roller coaster ride" that her
client, Tina, took her on, Dorothy spoke of how she has
learned to move from a participating to an observing
position
:
If I just start having a really strong
emotion. I try to partial out
countertransf erence , but a lot of the time I
really don't understand why I'm feeling so
angry or so incompetent. When it's just
something that's so salient or intense and I
don't understand it-that's kind of how I know
it's coming. But also now I don't get scared-I
kind of know the limits now and I know that
eventually it's going to end. I kind of just
now try to relax, when I can I put myself in an
observing position and try to process what's
going on. And I do make process comments now
which is helpful and which I couldn't do before
because I couldn't remove myself at all.
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So-etimes Dorothy's observing self takes a very literal
form
:
(S)ort of looking at myself from over there and
^aikino'lt^fnot''^' ^^^^
'"^^
t l g-it s not something you typically do.
and
(I) just temporarily forget where I am. it'slike everything goes gray and I really have tocome back-It's like I'm just really somewhere
else. It s all kind of a scary feelingGoing up and down with this person. I'm sort
of there but not there-I'm sort of where she's
at. So I really have to think about seeing
myself sitting where I'm sitting and comingback to that.
As with Sharon, Dorothy's ability to "bring herself
back" increased with experience:
Now that I've seen it, especially in Tina's
case, I've seen it so many times. I realize
things aren't going to fuck up if I say one
thing wrong, or if I expose my feelings too
much. There aren't the same fears associated
with performance so much. And now I have a
better sense of what it's going to be like to
be on a roller coaster. I can put it out there
and look at it. I wasn't able to do that at
the beginning because it was so foreign. That
helps an awful lot. And after the session I
think about where to go in the future, and what
was said in the last session, so just general
processing abilities helped a lot.
Dorothy did not elaborate on what these processing
abilities were. The shift from the experiencing self to
the observing self is one important ability and will be
elaborated in the next chapter. Once that shift is made
the therapist must analyze what has made her feel as she
has. She must think about what it is that she has
experienced, review what has transpired between herself
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and her client, think about how her feelings surfaced,
and consider the ongoing therapeutic context or other
issues that could be contributing to her feelings. The
therapist must ask herself such questions as what am I
experiencing, how did I come to feel this way, what
purpose might it serve for my client for me to feel this
way, and what of my own might I be contributing? (Tansey
& Burke, 1989). The therapist must sublimate and
scrutinize her feelings, thereby becoming "neutral"
(Thompson, 1980) and "objective about (her) subjective
experience" (Tansey & Burke, p. 87). These are the
functions of the observing self. This analyzing function
is an act of sophistication made possible by both
experience and theoretical knowledge. Comments by
Michael illustrated his use of his observing self:
I tend to do an exploration of where they
(feelings) come from for me, and then how they
fit in for my client. Kind of functionally,
what they mean for my client, or what they do
for ray client, and then I just try to think
about the intersection of those two. Also in
terms of why are those feelings salient for my
client at this time. As part of that, are
there particular reasons that they're salient
for me.
Rebecca spoke of asking herself similar questions.
She described that at first this could happen only after
a session. She would come out of a session and ask
herself what she had felt and consider why she might have
felt such a way. She summarized how she became more able
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to analyze these questions in the moment and to integrate
the experiencing and observing functions.
lll^.^i ^K^""^^ i^''*' backwards. Like how mightthis be there, how might these kinds offeelings fit in with what's going on. But
r!!i^ i^"?^ °^ session. And I stilleally didn't know what to do with it. Then
l^Lr^rl "^^""^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ tell meabout the person... So I would use it like that-not really do too much with it but have itinform me. And the way that that gets refinedIS so interesting to me. Next to kind of tryto think on my feet a little more, first of allto be able to be both self aware and listening
at the same time in a session is really hard,but kind of practising that. Some of it comesfrom realizing you don't have to listen to
every word the person says and hang onto thedetails of the content. So it kind of gives
you permission to say-'well, what am i feeling
right now', to move your attention in a littlebit. So I would try to pay attention to what I
was feeling in the room, and I would go through
some of that checklist in my mind.
Rebecca illuminates here a key to a successful use
of the self which is stepping back from the content and
looking at the feelings that are engendered as a function
of the content. This moves echoes the milestone
described by Ralph (1980) of moving beyond a client and
content centered approach to therapy. He says:
It represents a movement from a more concrete
approach that focuses on the content of the
hour, what the patient said and did, to a
relationship centered approach that focuses on
the metacontent of the hour-that is, the
feelings and emotions developed in the patient-
therapist relationship which generated that
content, (p. 246)
Sharon also recognized the need to step back from
content
:
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What I'm trying to do is be aware of myfeelings. it's like I go through this triage
n^f!n'";^^ t^l^""^ feelings or am I not. Andofte I think I'm not but I am, and it's reallyafter the fact that I realize I am. So then,
ok I am having feelings, then it's-are thesefeelings because the person wants me to feelhow they felt in a similar situation so they'redoing to me the same thing somebody did to
them?; or are these feelings the feelings thatthey feel right now? And those are two verydifferent things. So I try to make a decision
which IS going on. Often I get caught up in
the content and lose the sense of the feelings,
and often the content isn't important, but
that's where my struggle is right now-to let go
of the content stuff and just pay attention to
what's washing over me or coming through me.
Instead of content, Rebecca tries to focus on the
process of the session. This focus involves an awareness
of herself from which could be inferred the use of her
observing self:
To me, reflecting on the process means paying
attention to my experience, and if I'm not
doing that, then I'm not aware of my experience
and I'm just kind of there. I might be being
too chatty, or too much aligned, or too engaged
in content, or bored, or daydreaming. (It also
means paying attention to) what's going on
between the two of us... (and) turning my
thoughts to myself and asking why I'm reacting
as I am.
The awareness of the use of an observing self showed
developmental differences across levels of training but
the developmental process within the individual emerged
more strongly. Elizabeth expressed most clearly how an
awareness of herself and her internal process had
dramatically developed during the course of the past
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year. She attributed this largely to the role that
supervision has played in bringing her attention to
herse 1 f
.
(M)y supervisor throughout the whole year hasbeen asking me how did you feel? And I would
say-I don't know, I don't remember. So
apparently at the beginning of the year this
wasn't happening.
. .But it also took me time toget to the point where I am right now so it's agradual process-so I've noticed there's been abig change with that. Where now it's very
relevant to me-how am I feeling
, obviously
thinking as well... I mean his asking me kepttelling me it was something that I should be
noticing.
. .So I think that he really was
instrumental with my starting to look at it
myself without his having to ask about it. So
that has changed because of that process of hishelping me and me learning to do it myself.
Ralph (1980) maintains that supervision plays "the
crucial role in directing the trainee's attention"
(p. 247) to the therapeutic relationship and their own
responses
.
Though Elizabeth is the only trainee to highlight
the role of supervision in teaching her the importance of
self awareness and observation, her comments illuminate
the crucial role of supervision. The fact that only
Elizabeth mentioned supervision is in part due to the
lack of questions pertaining to supervision. There were
also no questions about the topic of the observing self
which might have elicited mention of supervision. Those
who write about supervision emphasize the importance of
supervision in this developmental achievement.
Issacharoff (1984) notes that through supervision, the
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trainee learns to shift from the experiencing to the
observing self. Bromberg (1984) suggests that
supervision serves the purpose of helping a therapist
develop what he called a third ear by listening to a
session as an outside observer. Jarmon (in press)
suggests that the "supervisee learns to scan the field of
therapeutic interaction, identifying with each
participant, but identifying also with a third position,
the observer, from which to observe the field as a
whole." As Elizabeth testified, at a roost basic level,
the supervisor's attention to the internal responses of
the supervisee (and what is consequently learned about
the client), educates the trainee as to the importance of
this.
A supervisor also serves as an auxiliary observing
self. Sharon alluded to the use of an auxiliary
observing self in suggesting that her beginning
experiences with Karen might not have been so extreme if
there had been someone observing behind the mirror:
It's like she took me on a train ride with
her. We'd walk into a session, and I had a
choice whether to pay attention to her, to
listen to her and try to follow her or not
to. And if I had chosen not to, I don't think
any of this would have happen. Or if someone
had been observing behind the mirror, I don't
think it would have felt quite the same to me.
It is interesting to speculate why having someone
observing would have enabled Sharon to feel
differently. Supervision plays a role in holding and
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containing the anxiety to allow trainees to reflect on
their experiences in the clinical context. Had there
been another person behind the mirror Sharon could have
aligned herself with that person and contained some of
her anxiety, using that alliance to build the «all around
her that she felt she lacked. Sharon's as yet fledging
ability to separate herself from the interaction in the
room did not provide sufficient distance and objectivity
needed to further her understanding of her client. Yet
she could imagine projecting herself as an observer into
a third person!
Perhaps having an observer would have bolstered her
observing ego for other reasons. Given a choice of
regressing with her client or defending against the
regression, Sharon might have used an observer to move
toward an adaptive non-regressive position, a move
beginning therapists would be likely to prefer. The role
of regression in the therapeutic encounter will be
explored in later chapters.
In addition to experiences in supervision, I believe
the ability to use the observing self increases as
therapists- in- training come to understand the nature of
their internal experience, and from the development of
what could be called the work ego of a therapist. These
topics will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
LEARNING TO WORK WITH AFFECT
The Nature of Identification., in t he Empathi. Pr-n.oc.
The concept of neutrality is frequently used to
characterize the background against which therapists
evaluate changes in their inner experience. Basch
(1983a) proposes that neutrality involves the therapist's
"controlling (their) affective needs and emotional
predilections so as to maintain an even-handed attitude
towards the content" (p. 697). He suggests that
neutrality depends on the ability to regard affective
reactions as objects of scientific scrutiny. Scientific
scrutiny includes an evaluation of the idiosyncratic and
personal sources of any reaction. King (1978) emphasizes
the importance of neutrality in asserting that "if the
analyst is to remain free to use his own affects to
understand his patient's unconscious conflicts, he must
maintain an attitude of neutrality or non attachment"
(p. 334). One's affective responses must be utilized as
sources of information about the therapeutic interaction.
Changes in the therapist's inner experience are
identified against a baseline of neutrality. When these
changes reach a level of intensity different from a
"neutral self" in interaction with the client, they
73
indicate that a trial identification has occurred; be it
through empathy or projective identification (Tansey and
Burke, 1989):
cIlL^I;^^^'^^ identificatory experienceharacterized by particular self experience andassociated affective states... His affective
reaction to the particular self experience
elicited by the imniediate interaction optimallyIS a signal affect' (p. 81)
It is through the "signal affect" (Beres & Arlow, 1974)
that the therapist is alerted to shift from experiencing
with the client to thinking about what has been
experienced and what the meaning is: to shift from an
experiencing to an observing position. Through a
conscious or preconscious (Schafer, 1959) sense of being
influenced emotionally, the therapist is alerted to use
her subjectivity to examine what she can learn about her
client's feelings. Schafer illuminates that in this
context, "affect functions here as a signal within the
ego for renewed reality testing (or scientific scrutiny)
rather than an intensification of defenses" (p. 347).
Opinion is strong that this trial identification must be
partial and short lived in order to be useful and not
create countertransf erence complications. Herein lies a
significant developmental step: learning to use one's
reactions as 'signal affects' that an identification has
taken place, thus indicating the need to shift from an
experiencing to an observing position.
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Shifting from the experiencing to the observing
position has been discussed with regard to individual
clinical interactions. However, the recognition of the
necessity of making this shift is a developmental
achievement for a therapist-in-training. Issacharoff
(1984) suggests that one role of supervision is to assist
the trainee in learning to shift from transient
identifications to self observing. Comments in the
previous chapter illustrate that such supervisory
interventions help the trainee realize how important this
shift is in therapeutic conduct.
The understanding that a therapist's inner
experience is responsive and vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of the client's experience reinforces the
importance of making this shift. Beginning therapists
often experience their internal reactions not as
information about their clients but as information only
about themselves. Tansey and Burke (1989) pinpoint this
confusion for therapists:
(V)iewing the self experience as reality rather
than as a powerful source of understanding
regarding both what is happening in the
therapeutic interaction and why the patient may
need him to feel this way.
However, to effectively process emotional communications,
a therapist must
recognize his emotional response to the
patient, not as a surface "reality", but as a
signal affect, containing potentially valuable
underlying meanings, which can alert the
therapist to the fact that an identification
experience has in fact occurred, (p. 84)
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in
Tansey and Burke consider this distinction necessary
utilizing any emotional communication from a patient.
Making such a distinction facilitates the shift from an
experiencing to an observing position.
Lakowics (1983) suggests that learning to view one's
inner response as information about the client rather
than as a "surface reality" becomes possible once the
trainee understands the concept of identification as
"something which (he) feels but cannot consciously
distinguish as originating in the patient" (p. 252). It
is through understanding the nature of identification in
the clinical interaction that the trainee comes to
understand "the concept of therapeutic intervention
through empathic responsiveness" (p. 253). Issacharoff
(1984) describes such identifications as "unconscious
but not deeply rooted" (p. 94).
Tansey and Burke suggest that the shift to the
observing position and the realization that the induced
affect is a powerful source of information is composed of
two separate stages: "containment" of the affective
experience and "separating" from it. Containing consists
of tolerating and maintaining in consciousness the
thoughts, feelings or impulses that are experienced.
This can be difficult for even experienced therapists
because affects that need to be contained are often
difficult to tolerate or can activate a therapist's
"unanalyzed" conflicts. Tansey and Burke suggest that a
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failure in containment is accompanied bydefensive operation with which the therapistblocks from conscious awareness those aspectsof his modified self experience which he cannottolerate, (p. 85)
Alternatively, they suggest that failure in containment
can result in the therapist acting in accord with what is
stirred up, thereby discharging it from consciousness.
While containing clients' induced states remains a
challenge for therapists throughout their clinical life,
tolerating the experience is only one of the
difficulties for beginning therapists. Beginning
therapists are often net aware of the utility of
containing their clients' painful feelings. Furthermore,
many trainees are no more attuned to their own inner
states than the clients they attempt to treat: they must
become more fluent at reading their inner experiences
just as their clients must.
After containment, Tansey and Burke suggest that the
therapist then must establish "a sense of separateness"
from the experience in order to examine the
identification and its related affects. They cite three
crucial insights (in addition to personality stability
and analytic ability) that provide the necessary
psychological distance from the identi f icatory
experience
.
1) The therapist must strive to suspend
potential superego criticism and be able to
experience himself in a temporarily unfavorable
light.
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expIrL^^r^h''''
"^li"^ that his current self-erience, however uncomfortable, does notconstitute an unmanageable threat to self-esteem when viewed in relation to apredominance of positive self
-representations
.
3) The therapist understands that the
mtrojective identification (trialidentification) is temporary, (p. 87)
All of these insights are especially difficult for
beginning therapists.
Tansey and Burke describe the failure to
psychologically separate from induced experiences.
Unlike a failure in containment, the therapist is able to
hold in consciousness the view of himself that has been
generated. He does not defensively either block or act
it out. However, the experience is taken as accurate
rather than as information that could help him understand
the world of his client; the change in experience is
taken as an "enduring actuality rather than as a
temporary and induced identification signally something
important about the client" (p. 88). The therapist is
unable to pull back enough from the material to observe
this change; to be "objective about his subjective
experience" (p. 87). The identification is then not
short lived or partial (Reich 1950) but prolonged and
seen as part of the therapist's self.
Basch (1983b) speaks similarly of the necessity to
separate from one's reactions to be able to understand
them:
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To be empathic an individual must be able to
VnTlllt sufficiently fro. his fLungs
to th^rK°''' '° ^^^^ '^'^^^^ °^ ^i'-Ply reacting
significance they have in the context in whichthey are experienced, (p. 119)
n n
Tansey and Burke present two alternative
consequences from the failure to gain sufficient
separateness from an identification. The therapist may
sustain problems in retaining conscious awareness of the
induced experience. "At the opposite extreme, the
therapist may remain all too aware of the induced feeling
with no perspective on its underlying meaning" (p. 87).
Tansey and Burke are writing about challenges and
failures at all levels of clinical development but their
insights are particularly helpful in illuminating
difficulties for beginning therapists in learning to use
their inner experience.
Jarmon (in press) also directs attention to the
problem of therapists becoming "overidentif ied with one
or more of the patients' significant objects":
Identifications become a problem when no longer
transient. They take hold of the therapist and
impede her capacity to both retain a sense of
her therapeutic self and to respond
empathically to her patient.
Especially for the beginning therapist who would have
only a rudimentary "therapeutic self", the propensity for
identifications to be prolonged is exaggerated. Lakovics
(1983) adds that when a transient identification
stimulates an inner conflict of the therapist it is
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especially hard to recognize th<^ > rl^r^•h •'-uyiij.ze ne identification as being
outside oneself" (p. 255^ To ±v.^VP the extent that beginning
therapists suffer from "medical school syndrome" as well
as not yet having explored their inner conflicts, they
are prone to overidentifying and failing to understand
the source of their experience. As will be discussed
shortly, it is the therapist's responsibility to separate
out how her conflicts contribute to any subjective
response to a client. However, the focus here is upon
the difficulty of recognizing that identifications and
the resulting affects created in the clinical encounter
can be used to understand clients rather than taken as
"surface realities" in themselves. Lakovics addresses
this problem in the beginning therapist:
The problem of differentiating those responses
whose source is the patient's pathology from
responses which are a lack of knowledge,
personal difficulties (whether neurotic or
otherwise) and/or supervisor related can be
insurmountable, (p. 252)
He says the key is learning to differentiate feelings and
reactions "which originate from the patient and therapist
as a consequence of the therapeutic relationship" from
those "which originate from the therapist's private
personal past" (p. 252).
Allowing oneself to be taken over by transient
identifications can endanger the necessary balance
between the experiencing and observing positions. One
can get drawn into either the participating or the
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observing side at the expense of the other. Thus far
this discussion has emphasized the loss of the ability to
observe due to a lack of awareness that an identification
has occurred. Tansey and Burke call this an "overcooked"
identification. Insufficient scrutiny is applied to the
change in experience and a "laissez faire" position is
taken in relation to the interactional pressure. They
suggest a significant risk results for reenacting in the
clinical relationship traumatic relationships the client
is recreating through the transference. Greenson (1960)
termed as "uncontrolled eropathizers" those therapists who
overidentify with clients and lose their clinical
perspective through too intense an involvement. Such
therapists are vulnerable to being overwhelmed or to
acting out. In a similar vein, Schafer (1959) suggests
when a therapist fails to sufficiently separate from the
experience the affect is acted out rather than used as a
signal for inspection. Instead of using her counter-
transference to understand the client's experience, the
therapist is pulled by her inner experience into a non-
analytic and potentially traumatizing interaction.
The opposite extreme is of too much interpersonal
distance which can foreclose on an emotional
understanding of a client. An "intellectually distant
state" (Berger 1987, p. 38) results in an inability to
make use of or be open to experiencing transient
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identifications. Greenson (i960) suggests that these
"Phobic erapathizers" are "unconsciously unwilling to
leave the position of the uninvolved observer" out of
fear of the feelings or a fear of being "unable to regain
a sense of self after the identification is
experienced
.
Tansey and Burke say the identifications that result
in this position are "undercooked identifications." They
suggest that sometimes due to the potency of both the
interactional pressure and of what is being transmitted,
a therapist will be overly rigid or controlling, as if
anticipating an attempt to influence her to a degree that
she unconsciously wishes to avoid. Depending on the
dynamic involved and the intensity with which it is being
transmitted, therapists vary in how open they are to the
impact of any particular interaction. A therapist's
tolerance for various trial identifications is correlated
with her tolerance for potentially difficult internal
experiences
.
The nature and intensity of the interactional
communication being processed vis-a-vis the
therapist's capacity to tolerate the transitory
modification of his self experience largely
determines the degree of awareness in the
therapist of the identification experience.
(1989, p. 82)
It seems an easy assumption to make that as a
beginning therapist, one's ability to tolerate these
modifications in self experience is limited. Especially
when these self experiences involve feelings of
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helplessness, incompetency or failure, beginning
therapists might defensively over or underidenti fy with
these changes in inner experience.
As training progresses, there is an increased
ability to make the shift from experiencing the
identification to observing and thinking about what has
transpired. The shift grows smoother as the trainee
"gains experience and is more able to tolerate and accept
them (identifications) as a necessary and useful (albeit
often disturbing) part of the psychoanalytic process"
(Issacharoff, 1984, p. 94). Through supervision on how
to analyze one's internal experience a trainee is shown
the usefulness of such a shift. This shift is also
facilitated by an increased understanding of the nature
of identifications (Lakovics, 1983) and how to separate
from and use them. Additionally, it would appear that
this shift becomes more possible as the trainee develops
what has been called a work ego (Olinick, 1969), a second
self (Schafer 1983), or a therapeutic self (Goldberg,
1984; Jarmon, in press); which along with neutrality,
serves as a base from which to observe changes in inner
experiences. Making this shift is reinforced by the fact
that "a feeling of relief is associated with regaining
the observing position" (Issacharoff, 1984, p. 95).
Finally, learning how the concept of identification
explicates how feelings and fantasies imagined as one's
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own "are not only expected but originate within the
patient" is relieving for a trainee (Lakovics, p. 253).
The danger always exists of attributing all
reactions to one's client without exainination of one's
personal contribution. Tansey and Burke characterize the
"totalist" view of countertransf erence as potentially
using the patient's unconscious as the royal road to
one's own. It is incumbent upon a therapist to separate
out her private contribution to countertransf erence
. A
therapist must review what has transpired and how her
feelings surfaced, examine her working model of the
client, consider the therapeutic context as well as her
own proclivities to determine possible connections
between her experience and that of her client (Tansey &
Burke, 1989). Tansey and Burke summarize criteria for
establishing along a continuum the extent to which an
identification is reflective of the patient's internal
world and a response to the interactional pressure, or to
which it may have been stimulated in the patient's
presence but "emanate predominantly from the therapist's
essentially private concerns" (p. 35):
1) the degree of the therapist's consciousness
(or lack thereof)
2) the degree of control over the intensity of
the experience
3) the degree of separateness or
differentiation of ego boundaries maintained by
the therapist
4) the type of introjection involved
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lLTllll:Ll'/ ic^entification is concordant or
They stress that any conclusion about the meaning of
one's subjective response must be clinically validated
through the client's response to subsequent
Interventions. They also stress that any subjective
response of the therapist is a unique compromise of her
own personality with the affect and role relationship
(Sandler, 1976) that the client is trying to induce,
albeit at times unconsciously.
The attempt to understand a therapist's inner
experience as either a purely personal response (the
classical view of countertransf erence ) or as totally
induced by a client is fanciful. Most clinical
interactions strong enough to induce a response in the
therapist will contain a mixture of all of the possible
sources of affect:
Unfortunately, the therapist's inner thoughts
contain mixture of messages, and the sources of
the messages are not easy to distinguish. Some
stem from vibrations in harmony with elements
in the patient, others originate from the
therapist-as a separate individual or as an
individual interacting with the patient.
(Berger 1987, p. 28)
The impossibility of clearly separating out the
source of one's affect relates to attempts to distinguish
between empathy and projective identification. Though
empathy is often conceptualized in terms of only
concordant identifications and as sharing in the
conscious ego state of the client, it is to be understood
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as sharing and comprehending a ccBplex hierarchy of
drives, defenses, and internal structures (Schafer,
1959); sharing in a psychological state which is .„uch
more than just concordant identifications. Efforts to
delineate empathy and projective identification in a
clinical encounter involve both subjectivity and
therapists' unique sensitivities:
"decisions about
coerciveness, disruptiveness
, intensity, psychopathology
(are) essentially arbitrary" (Tansey & Burke, p. 63).
This is the complicated realm of the voluntary and
unconscious transmission of affect.
Along these lines, Berger's thoughts about the
differences between empathy and countertransference apply
to the differences between empathy and projective
identification:
To attempt to be overly exact would be to
overreach, and the end result would be a
reified inaccurate description of a complexdynamic process. (1987, p. 40)
An additional hurdle in attempting to identify the
origin of one's affect is the complicated nature of
affect. "One of the peculiarities of affect is that they
are felt by others and they induce or are expected to
induce in others identical or opposing affects" (Rycroft,
1968, in King, 1978). The interpersonal communication of
affect is both a subtle and complex process. It ranges
from primarily verbal modes with a relatively high degree
of separation between subject and object to more
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•primitive
.odes such as affect contagion where a strong
affect in an individual stimulates the same affect in
another- (Furer, 1967. p. 279, stern, 1985). As Berger
says
:
The roots of emotional experience are
in^or'^'f^^^.'"^^^^"^"^^- Compounded by
^nH^K^^'^T
°f .en'otions, their subliminal naturea d the blurring of boundaries between sel? andobject that occurs at archaic levels ofexperience, (p. 35)
Therapists come to feel what their clients feel.
This occurs through both projective processes on the
parts of clients and through empathic resonance. Empathy
most commonly refers to resonance with a client's
conscious experience and the delineation between empathy
and projective identification is probably easier when the
identification is complementary. However, despite
important differences between these concepts, the
literature on empathy abounds with statements that imply
that the origin of the therapist's affect is in her
patient. Empathy is defined thus: "sample of the
patient's inner state" (Fenichel, 1953), sampling
feelings of another, sharing in the affect,
experientially knowing another's state (Berger, 1987),
sharing in what is understood to exist in another
(Schafer, 1959). Both empathy and projective
identification produce feelings within the therapist that
could be understood as originating in the
client
.
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Through coining to understand the transient nature of
identification and how affect is communicated, therapists-
in-training learn to use their internal responses as
information about their clients. This involves learning
to recognize, contain, separate from and observe what is
felt. Crucial to this is learning that what is
experienced might have its origins in one's clients. If
therapists miss this contribution to their experience,
they lose a powerful vehicle for understanding their
clients, and worse, risk a countertransferential
reenactment of a client's previous relationships.
The above discussion highlights a fundamental
question about the origin of the affect that therapists
experience in the clinical situation. It was not
possible to evaluate through a research interview the
origin of the affect which therapists-in-training
experience in their clinical work. This assessment is
accomplished in the ongoing context of supervision. It
was possible however, to explore the thoughts of
therapists- in- training as they were beginning to
understand that what they experience is related to what
their clients experience, even if unconsciously. This is
one of the first steps in beginning therapists learning
to make use of the concept of trial identifications and
the signal affects which are induced by these
identifications.
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The Differ^ntH ation of i-h^
Origin nf i^ff^^^
This section explores trainees' views about where
their feelings come from in the clinical encounter. The
following example illustrates what is meant by the
problem of the differentiation of the origin of affect.
A client is 20 minutes late for a session which she
spends talking about her abusive boyfriend. The
therapist feels angry during the session. The
therapist's anger contains different information
depending upon where she thinks it originated. Is the
therapist reacting angrily to her client's lateness?
Perhaps the client's lateness was not able to be avoided
and the therapist would have been angry with the client
regardless of the content of the session. In this case
the anger is a response to an event but originates in the
therapist. In another scenario the lateness might have
been an expression of the client's anger towards the
therapist, thus the anger originated in the client. Is
the therapist feeling angry because the client told about
excruciatingly painful experiences without any apparent
affect, leaving the therapist to supply the affect that
the client is defending against; here too, the origin
would be in the client. Is the therapist identifying
with her client's anger at her boyfriend? Perhaps the
client was late, knowing this would anger her therapist,
and together with provocation and affectless recounting
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of stories about her abuse could produce the anger in the
therapist that the client could not tolerate in herself?
More contextual information would be needed to make sense
of the session. However, each explanation suggests a
different view of the cl ient- therapist relationship for
the therapist's consideration.
To be consistent with the language of the data, I
will use the phrase 'the therapist is feeling the
client's feelings.' This is problematic for one can only
experience one's own feelings. However, affect can be
understood as having its origin within the client but
affecting a resonance within the therapist through
processes such as projective identification, trial
identification, affect contagion and empathy. Buie
(1981) describes a moment of "empathic resonance":
This was not a sadness of his own and it was
not sympathy. Experientially , it seemed to be
her sadness which he felt. (p. 301)
The differentiation of the origin of affect within an
interpersonal context is a complex process.
Sharon and Michael are two therapists-in-training
whose comments illustrate the problem. This is Sharon:
It took me awhile to learn that often when I
was feeling something in the room, that it was
the client's feelings that I was feeling. I
mean I felt that it was my feelings, and I
didn't understand why I was having these
feelings
.
Although Sharon is not always sure whose feelings
she is experiencing, she is clear that at times it is her
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clients'. In contrast, Michael is just beginning to
consider that his tendency to "feel too r^uch of what the
client is feeling" results in part because of his
client. He is grappling with an emerging sense that he
feels his clients' feelings.
I have thought of it (his feeling too much) ascoming from me but I think I need to think ofit-I m beginning to think of it as coming a lotfrom the client.
Developmental Differences
Much of the differences among therapists-in-training
in thinking about whose feelings they were experiencing
related to their level of training. in her 4th year,
Sharon conveys a surety that Michael, a 2nd year student,
does not express. Two therapists in their first year of
seeing clients could not imagine experiencing feelings
whose origins were in their clients. For example, in
considering whether he ever felt uncertain about whose
feelings he was experiencing Peter said: "I always feel
like they're my feelings." Isadora expressed a similar
viewpoint
:
It's always felt like my feelings, even the
anxiety-I felt like I was anxious, and the most
I can say is that discussing it it felt like
those feelings were there because of the
interaction between us but they still felt like
mine. I've never felt like this is a feeling
that's totally new to me and I don't know where
it's from... I'm not uncertain whether it's me
or someone else, I might be uncertain about
what I'm feeling, but my confusion isn't about
if it's somebody else's feelings.
Such categorical statements were not made by more
experienced therapists. Sharon described her work with
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Karen, a psychotic client with «hon, she had first
considered the question of whose feelings she was
experiencing:
a feeling that this wasn't me "liK ^^e'
you ?hat';' '"^^^ goLg'thr^ugh-t I was a vesicle or a vehicle.
Another experienced trainee, Jane, described a similar
process of her client "giving" her feelings to her:
(I) think her sense of helplessness was sopowerful. It wasn't something that she hadenough ego strength to tolerate in thatintensity so in some ways she was giving thatto me to sort of hold for her.
Jane explained that she was very susceptible to
being given or to taking on her clients' feelings. Her
grasp of this has changed during her training:
(I)'d say that as I've developed as a
therapist, that I've become more aware of thefact that they are not my feelings that I'm
feeling. I've taken on someone else's feelingsbut there's much more of a conscious awareness
of who those feelings belong to.
Rebecca was also sure that at times her affect
originated in her clients. She described how she felt
listening to a client's emotionless account of how she
had never grieved the death of her father:
Meanwhile I was-I felt myself tearing up, felt
this incredible loss, felt myself thinking
about my own father. Just felt really upset
and sad, and sad for her. And I felt like I
was grieving for her father, 35 years ago.
And this person who I had never met and didn't
know too much about and she had no connection
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The distinction between ovr^^v^u experiencing one's own
feelings or one's clients i c;^xx s often not clear even for
advanced trainees. The process of differentiation is
illustrated by Rebecca's account of her work with
a classic narcissistic personality disorder
anvi-h'''
'''11^''^ ^'^'^ egocentric or
'
nything like that, but just in the sense ofthe emptiness, the absolute inability to
connect... a number of times we would sit in asession and she would talk about her work, herweek and this and that, and she would leave and
I would feel so dead, and so, not just that I
would be tired, because that was always a part
of it because I would be bored, but that I
would just leave there feeling drained-
absolutely empty, I couldn't go on, I wouldlose my enthusiasm for everything, felt like
nothing mattered. And the next week she would
come m and talk about what a great session
that had been, how great she had felt, because
she had sorted out how to handle some problem.
And I just would have been for days feeling
like nothing mattered, absolutely sapped,
boredom, discouraged, not even-didn't have
enough emotion to feel discouraged, I was just
blah. And after that happened several times I
began to think about that this isn't mine, this
is her, and I'm holding onto all this so she
can go off feeling good. But I don't want this
anymore
.
How did Rebecca come to realize these were her client'
feelings?
(B)ecause it was dif ferent-there ' s times when I
have felt drained, and I felt that because my
client has taken a lot from me, but this was
different, she wasn't taking anything from me,
there was no connection, so it's not like she's
using me in some way or depleting me, it just
felt like she was infusing her own empty space
into me to not have to deal with the anxiety of
that on her own.
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These developmental changes reflect
.ore than how
this question is talked about. All three of the above
advanced trainees spoke of earlier periods in training
when they would not have conceptualized it as
experiencing feelings which originated in their clients.
Part of the developmental change is exposure to concepts
which explicate the mechanisms by which therapists
experience their clients' feelings. As Rebecca's
comments illustrate, the examination of one's feelings in
the context of what is known about the client may lead
one to conclude that the feelings originate within the
client. Part of the change is an intellectual process
but experiential learning is also required. Such
learning is influenced by the kind of clients one has
worked with as well as one's experiences in supervision.
Feeling What Clients Feel
Despite developmental and experiential differences
in how they viewed the origin of affect in the clinical
context, most trainees in this study thought that the
feelings that were evoked in them were in part co-
determined by their clients feelings. For instance, in
reference to her sad feelings in relation to a client
with whom she was terminating, Isadora said: "those are
my feelings-not just hers, but I think I was feeling part
of her feelings for her."
It was apparent in the comments of other trainees
that they also thought they experienced their client's
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.ff.ct. Michael described his work with a client in play
therapy who would create a shadow of his hand with a
flashlight and bring it down frc the ceiling to strangle
Michael
:
There's an 11 year old boy who I'm seeing nowwho plays out a lot of scenes that are jus?filled with terror, and I see very UttJeindication that he experiences it. I think he
?ha? s^h'r^' 'I ^° ^-^^ ^ superiia^.''T t the way he copes with it and I don'tthink he experiences it and I sometimes
experience it.
Sharon understood herself to be "feeling feelings that
these people were feeling deep down, but were so defended
against that they weren't aware of." she commented that
this often happens with one client in particular:
I have a client who doesn't feel feelings, and
she's better now than she was 2 1/2 years ago,but she really has consciously trained herself
not to have feelings because that was the way
she wanted to get through life. And I tend to
have two reactions to that. One is to get
frustrated and angry at her, like to the point
where I want to shake her, but the other is to
feel the feelings that I think she should be
feeling
.
Sharon sees this happening in one of two ways:
I bet that a lot of what she does is give me a
lot of her split off-I think that anger is her
split off piece of her that she's given me.
That she's really not able to have it and
experience it, but she either makes me angry by
how she acts or she'll describe situations
where she should be feeling angry and she
isn't, and I become angry in place of her, and
in both places I become the repository of the
anger that she can't have.
Sara also experienced herself as feeling what a client
could not feel:
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A woman who had been through so much-incestShe ]ust seemed so tensed un =oh ,anw ^^^1^^ 1- i-ciisea p and removed from
?eel thii ?% ?"^k''- ^^^^^ verbalize- I
b^iw ^ ^ ^^^^ she was really alank screen emotionally. And I felt likedying on the spot, and really felt upse^ Iwanted to cry, got teary. And she felt ^hecouldn't do that because it would aU jus^ comeout and never stop coming out. So I felt thatI was feeling what she knew she couldn t fee!
Trainees' conclusions about whether they felt what
their clients felt appeared to be unrelated to
considerations about the origin of their affect. As
Isadora's comments illustrate, she was comfortable saying
that she experienced her client's feelings but still
maintained that all her feelings originated in herself.
Sharon, Michael and Sara have also said they felt their
clients' feelings yet each held a different view about
where their affect originated.
Considerations Beyond Empathy
Sara was just beginning to struggle with her sense
that part of what she experienced originated in her
clients. In speaking about whether she felt penetrated
by a client's particularly vivid descriptions of paternal
sexual abuse, Sara said:
I didn't feel it was like a pipeline or
anything like that. But I definitely felt like
this was in some ways part of her. I mean
empathy only goes so far, and I thought this
must be some little teeny bit of how she must-
underneath it all-underneath this robot mode,
really feel. So in that sense they would
penetrate me.
The power of these experiences is suggested by the
evocativeness of Sara's language. When I asked whether
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she ever felt confused about whose feelings she .i,ht be
experiencing, she replied:
mfor both^^r' ' "'""^ l^""" " it h" or
TwoSld feel 2^%"""" ^'^ " think that
io:Vut t?:
. °jt":rriiS?L'sr ^^^^"^^
When that happened I Zll.^lll'll.Tr^t J^^'be coming from her, when I would feel-I sort offeel like I know I'm a nice person bit iTnotthat nice-like those kinds of thoughts.That s when I would feel this isn't just me.It s coming from her.
In suggesting that "empathy only goes so far," Sara
senses that there is something else that would explain
her experience. Her struggle to conceptualize how part
of what she felt originated in her client is similar to
that of trainees who were not familiar with the concept
of projective identification and had not learned in
supervision that clients could induce their therapists to
experience their feelings.
It is not only through projective identification
that therapists come to feel their clients' feelings. In
the interviews trainees defined empathy only in terms of
concordant identifications. They drew a clearer
distinction between empathy and projective identification
than those that appear in the literature where empathy is
considered a more inclusive concept. One reason for this
is that the concept of projective identification is often
explained by reference to the unconscious desire on the
client's part to have an impact on the therapist; whereas
empathy is understood as arising voluntary from a
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therapist's effort to understand. This distinction can
be seen in trainees references to clients "giving their
feelings to them."
Jane viewed the differentiation of her clients-
feelings from her own as central to clinical work. She
felt that a delineation around empathy is very important
for clinical reasons.
Part of being close to someone is being able to
experience their feelings in some way or tofeel like you know what they're feeling in a
very deep way. Whose feelings belong to whobecome much more blurred in close intimate
relationships, and that's sort of the nature of
It. In terms of doing clinical work there are
certain kinds of boundaries and a much clearer
sense of how you use those feelings in terms ofbeing a therapist. I think projective
identification adds a lot to that domain. If
I'm in an intimate relationship I'm not quite
as concerned with whose feelings are whose and
what those feelings mean or any of those types
of things. As far as being a therapist and
working with a client, those issues are very
important in terms of the kind of work that vou
do.
As can be seen and will be elaborated later, Jane
attributes her ability to make this distinction in large
part to her experiential understanding of the concept of
projective identification.
In contrast, Wendy did not find it meaningful to
attempt to distinguish the origin of her feelings.
Once that I figure out that I'm feeling
something, I usually don't question whether
it's mine or someone else's. Like if I'm with
someone sad and we're both sad-or when talking
to someone who is sad-if I start feeling sad
I'm aware of starting to feel sad but I never
question whether it's my sadness or theirs.
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mTiu^f ^"'P^thy issue comes in for me-
them
.1 don t really have the concept that I'
^h^i's'al^r.t^d' ''r? '^^^^"^^ -yt at mos disembodied-it's almost-I mightuse the Idea that I'm feeling bored becausethis person is bored and I'm picking up theirboredom, so more in an empathy sense I think
.
.
Isadora also did not find it meaningful to consider
that the origin of her affect could be in her client.
She did not find the concept of projective identification
significant nor had it been stressed in supervision that
what she experienced might originate in her client. In
considering the idea that her feelings did not come from
her, she said:
That's a hard question. Do they come from me?
I mean why does a feeling occur. A feeling
occurs for me usually because either a thought
or an external event. So as I said, if the
feeling occurs during or after a session, to me
it's been initiated by the interaction with
that person but it triggers a feeling that is
not foreign to me, and exists in me
generally.
.. (For instance) I wasn't feeling
particularly rejected in my life at that time
but I have in the past, so it was more-this
exists so now here's another experience of
something I've already experienced. It's
because of this client that it's occurring at
this moment.
It is possible that neither Wendy nor Isadora have
had experiences where part of what they felt had origins
in their clients. Neither of them seemed to have
considered the potential for an empathic resonance with
their clients' feelings.
Jane and Rebecca expressed a contrasting view. Jane
felt that it was often on an unconscious level that she
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"took on" or resonated with her clients' feelings.
Rebecca said:
c?i^n/^'%^^''?^^^^'^^ identification when thel ent Dust isn't angry at all, is not
rP^l^i^"^'''^ ^^^^^ ^'"^ experiencing itea ly strongly, and there's nothing thatthey ve said that's pissed me off... it's onething If somebody's just bad mouthing somebodyor If somebody's-it's even different if
somebody's being obnoxious in some way orpushing one of my buttons. But if somebody's
Dust talking and I can't understand why I'm
enraged then it's just something-it's like
unconscious to unconscious instead of justgoing through any conscious channels. Againthat's just my own way of seeing it.
Michael had a viewpoint that seemed to be between
those of Isadora and Wendy and those of Rebecca and
Jane. He at one point had referred to himself as
"catching his client's feelings", echoing what Jane and
Rebecca had said. At times he sounded more like Isadora
and Wendy:
I think of it in just kind of a vague way as a
function of the interaction, that I come to
feel what he was feeling. But I don't yet have
the concept of him giving it to me."
The Impact Of Supervision
Supervision can be seen as playing a pivotal role in
Michael's transition as evidenced in the following
exchange about whose feelings it is that he experiences:
Interviewer: Have you ever felt confused about
whose feelings you were experiencing?
Michael: No. I'm so quick to assume that
they're mine that I haven't. And then it's
kind of wrenched out of me that they're not all
mine
.
Interviewer: Wrenched out in a session or in
supervision?
Michael: Mostly in supervision. Although
that's shifted-a lot of the supervision happens
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inside my head now Sn -i i- u
that. But I don't'of^^n feerconT'"/'"'
might feel confused about th^
nfused. i
whose it is. session but not
Interviewer: Although you used to feelconfused, right?
Michael: No. I ue;pri i-rs k«
interviewer, So-^^rou n'^hrrro^Lnf"^"^- ' '
Michael: Right.
Michael has begun to internalize his supervision
Rebecca and Sharon also spoke of their processes of
internal supervision. Rebecca described her steps in
learning to differentiate whose feelings she was
experiencing
:
I would have all these feelings and I wouldleave and go to supervision, or sit down andthink Alright. I have this strong feeling isthere any reason that I should have had thisfeeling?" So in a really structured way but
outside of the session, asking myself where didthat come from? Is it something they did that
made me feel that way, or did something happen
in my life recently that I'm feeling this way
that triggered it off, or is it something
that's absolutely unexplainable
. .
.
( N ) ow if I
get this feeling that's inexplicable, I can
kind of relate it to something that's going on
in the person's unconscious. Before I could do
that, before I had enough of an access into
unconscious stuff, if it was absolutely
unexplainable, then I could start to think of
it as projective identification and then I
could look backwards. Like how might this be
there, how might these kind of feelings fit in
with what's going on. ...Then the next piece
of that is what can this tell me about the
person... So like if I had these tremendously
angry feelings, I'd come out and go through
this list. So if there was nothing they were
saying that was making me angry, so then I
would say ok, maybe it's something they're
putting into me. Then narrowing it, saying
maybe they're making me experience the fact
that there's a really angry aggressive part of
him
.
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Rebecca's description of her internal supervision
focuses on when she might be the recipient of her
client's projective identification. Her emphasis is upon
the unconscious communication between her clients and
herself. m contrast, Sharon's process of internal
supervision includes interactional as well as unconscious
processes by which she might come to feel her clients'
feelings
.
and when
ient is doing
I try to pay attention to my feelings,
I'm having feelings, I try to make adistinction between whether the cl
something and I'm feeling something in response
to It, and what I'm feeling is indeed what they
are feeling, and so they're doing whatever they
need to do to give me their same feelings, or
they're doing something to me, and what I'm
feeling is a clue to me of what they're
feeling. It's like if you're angry at me and
shout at me and make me feel bad, either you
want me to know what it's like to feel bad, or
you want me to be aware of your anger. And
those are two very different things. And so as
a therapist, when I'm feeling something, what
I'm always trying to figure out is which of
those two things it is, that's going to be
useful to me as a therapist. And if you make
the wrong guess it's hopeless. Because if
you're angry and make me feel hurt and I start
talking to you about how hurt you must feel,
and what you're really feeling is angry, then
we're really off base. And similarly, I tend
to do the opposite actually-someone gets angry
at me and I feel hurt and say 'gee, I can tell
you're feeling really angry,' and they say 'no
I'm not angry,' and I'm missing the point that
what's going on is that they're very hurt.
The Differentiation Of Affect Which Is Similar To One's
Own
The differentiation of the origin of affect is
especially difficult when it involves separating out
clients' feelings which are similar to one's own.
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Michael spoke of how he always seemed to be able to "find
a link" between his own issues and his clients'
feelings. Supervision has focussed on separating out how
much is his feeling and how much is his clients'. He
reported that with Nathan, his own issues
.ade him prone
to confuse the origin of his affect.
At the end of the sessions when I felt soterrible, I think I was feeling his feelinq of
back"' a''h'k'
therefore he'wouldn t come. And his feeling was having failed and Ididn t want him anymore and actually that wasmy feeling that he didn't want me anymore. Andthere were a few of those times where it was
very clear to me later that I hadn't done
anything so terrible in the session ... But I wasreally distraught at times-the intensity of myfeelings was really amazing to me.
Interviewer: How was it resolved?
Michael: I think through realizing it
Realizing that I hadn't done anything so
terrible. And realizing that the degree to
which it was an issue that was important tohim. The issue of feeling like he had failed,feeling abandoned.
Interviewer: And so it sounds like a
combination of supervision and reviewing who
Nathan is helped you realize.
Michael: Yeh. Also somewhat reviewing who I
am. I think there are personal issues that
made me more prone to identifying. That really
helped to resolve it a lot actually. To
realize what those were.
Interviewer: So it sounds consistent with the
work of separating out-
Michael: Him and me.
Isadora also struggled with the apparent similarity
between her feelings and those of her clients. This
meant to Isadora then, that what she felt originated
entirely in herself. She spoke of various feelings she
experienced with her clients, feelings of rejection.
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nurturance and vagueness anA i», d m considering whether her
clients had produced these feelino., h„ kt iings m her she saidi
That's a hard one. I think-yes they'veproduced them at that time bit aU Losefee ings exist in me. I think a lot of
ll llall :s%''?'.""' ^ ^--t feel
way, I mean, mothe?i^g ee ng° e":ci:a'"'
that It happened at those times was due to
Work With More Disturb., nn....
^ 3 ^ Cont.Pv. ForConsiderations Ahonr The Orir^.n pf Affpo"
Perhaps it is in experiencing alien feelings that
trainees begin to consider that they can have feelings
which originate in clients. it was through experiencing
unfamiliar feelings that Jane first thought about her
clients "giving" their feelings to her:
The first time it came up was with thisborderline client in supervision. I was just
so frustrated and I didn't have any way to
explain those types of feelings. Feelings of
anger. And those are feelings that I don't
experience very often. It was very striking
for me to be feeling those types of intense
emotions. And my supervisor and I discussed
the whole concept of projective identification
and how it fit it. And it just provided me
with a framework to think about my experience
and thinking about my client and myself and how
it fit together. So the first experience of
finding that concept useful was in the context
of having feelings that I didn't usually have.
And that was a clue that something was going
.
Trainees who had worked with borderline clients
found meaningful the idea that they could experience
feelings which originated in their clients. In
reflecting on the concept of projective identification
Jane said:
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comfortable if i hadn't A ^^^^^n't feel as
borderline ciient SoL^H"'' ^^^^^^^ ^ith a
Of client pro'Ses con? x^for'^h^'w'^'the question of whos: f::L^gL
Another advanced trainee spoke of her work with
borderline clients at a suicidal crisis center to
illustrate her conviction that she could be made to
experience her clients' feelings:
It's interesting, but projective identificationhappens constantly when I see the cUe^ts atES It happens all the time and it's entirelyprotective identification. They're gre!? at
^
It. It happens at one shot deals often. These
wl?h th'^""!.^".^"^
''^^
^'^^ ^^^^ a sessionit em-45 minute evaluation-it's always withborderlines, and they infuse me with all their
anxiety and they leave feeling better. Andit's the most incredible experience. You can
watch it happen, and you can't stop it becausethey're too good at it. But they'll come in
and say 'I'm gonna cut, I'm gonna cut, I did
some cutting'. And they won't tell you thatthey feel better, but they'll go and hang out
and by the end of it I'm filled with incredible
anxiety.
.. maximum anxiety, and I can feel it
rising as I sit with them, I just feel it going
up and up, and I know what they're doing but
they're great at it. I don't know how they do
it, but they're great at it.
If working with borderline clients provides a
context for considering oneself to be experiencing
another's feelings, then it is not only developmental
change that explains different views among trainees about
the origin of their affect. This is corroborated by
Dorothy and Sharon, both of whom in their first year of
seeing clients grappled with this question due to seeing
seriously disturbed clients. It is interesting that in
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reflecting on their initial reactions to clinical work,
both Sharon and Dorothy spoke of fearing that being a
clinician meant being on an emotional "roller coaster."
Sharon spoke of her early work with Karen:
tL^'''^%^^'^''\''^' ^^^y crazy-it was a clienthat would not have been assigned to me as myfirst client if people had realized how crazvshe was And she used to decompensate duringthe session, and she would start talking
nonsense. She would talk at a rapid fi?e clipfor 50 minutes m such a way that the only waythat I could say anything was to say- 'wait
excuse me, Karen!' (waving hand) and the ^tuffthat she said often wouldn't make any senseShe d start a sentence and stop in midstream
and start talking about something else. And
everything would be tangential. And I used to
come out of that room feeling crazy, Iliterally felt crazy. And a couple'of times Ihad to go and track down my supervisor and say
'I don't know what to do with this-I reallyfeel nuts.' So anything after that has been
much easier for me to deal with. But it was
also an interesting trial by fire because it
taught me about that phenomenon, so I don't
think I'm surprised or upset when it happens to
me now and it never happens to the same degree.
Interviewer: The phenomena of?
Sharon: Of feeling like they put their stuff
into me.
How did this become meaningful?
I remember my supervisor making it clear that
basically what I was feeling was Karen's
feeling. She was conveying it to me in this
way because she didn't have any other way of
conveying it rather than that I was crazy.
Which it felt like. Rather it was that I was
experiencing her craziness.
Sharon effectively conveyed how crazy she had been
made to feel in her work with Karen. She was relieved
learn that her "craziness" could be explained. In
discussing how the concept of identification is an
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"excellent vehicle" for teaching trainees to for..
interventions on the basis of "en^pathic responsiveness,"
Lakowics (1983) sheds light on how iinportant it would be
for Sharon to know it was her client's craziness:
Without a conscious recognition of the
varieties of identifications, it is notpossible to respond empathically on a
consistent and prolonged basis to patients withserious and complex psychopathology
. (p. 253)
The intensity of Sharon's experience was echoed by
Dorothy in her descriptions of her early work with Tina.
For Dorothy, the alien nature of what she felt was in the
intensity of the feelings.
(I) would have such incredible emotions about
things. I would leave the room so angry-I
would leave the room and my neck would be beet
beet red. And I would feel like I had no
control over getting that angry. I don't think
it was just a countertransf erence problem. I
would be so fucking angry. Or just so fucking
confused. Extreme forms of emotions.
Sometimes she would give it to me big times,
but other times it was hard to understand why I
would be feeling such extreme emotions.
After the first session:
I ended up calling my supervisor. I was seeing
her on Fridays, and at one point I called
saying 'I don't know what went on but I was so
angry I almost couldn't contain-what is going
on?' I was upset the whole weekend. I woke up
in the middle of the night-that kind of upset.
Just really taken aback by what had gone on.
And I couldn't understand why I was continuing
to feel that way. I just couldn't shake it so
I ended up calling him and talking about it.
That made it more manageable.
Since some of what Dorothy experienced was related
to competence and failure, as a beginning therapist it
was hard to differentiate whose feelings these were:
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At the beginning it was difficult to r»=,n
I.IVJIV'T ""^ f^oi: h c e
"
supervision, I saw that it was coming fromthem. I could see differences between thethree clients and that's how I knew wasn'tDust me reacting in a particular ^ay to '
'
particular things.
I asked Dorothy if she ever felt confused about whose
feelings she was experiencing?
Yeh. I went through that a while agoEspecially at the beginning it was very
confusing. I didn't know what projectiveIdentifications were, I had no experience withthis kind of therapy at all. Supervisionhelped enormously. That's probably the biggestfactor. In terms of my borderline, I had
observed some one with a borderline client overthe summer, and just remembering some what thetherapist had talked about in terms of herfeelings. So I was a little prepared thatthat could be there but I was like-'not me '
•
That's not going to happen to me.' So when'it
started to happen in repetitive ways, and it
started to happen in different ways, although Iknew I didn't feel competent, that wasn't the
only thing that was going on. With Tina, I
specifically felt incompetent but I didn't feel
that way with R, so something's going on with
them-I'm not having the same reactions of
feeling incompetent, since that was my biggest
concern. So I think just seeing different
clients, and having a chance to talk about it
in supervision, and fitting together what I had
heard from others about how clients made them
feel.
It is largely through her work with Tina that Dorothy
became comfortable with the idea that she might
experience her client's feelings.
I feel the anger was the biggest one. I
definitely think-she was feeling very angry, I
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wasn t feeling angry for any reason. The stuffshe was talking about didn't make me angry! ^twas the way that she presented it... I think theway she produced the feelings in me, I t^^nkthe anger was a defense against her fear ofloss, and the way she made me feel angry was tomake me feel as vulnerable and almost at lossas she was. Like 'I'm not good at anything I'mdoing and you're not good at therapy.' So shebasically attacked me as her therapist. But itwas more than just the words, it was the wholeinteraction. There was a lot of bodylanguage. I didn't even realize how angry I
was until she called my attention to it, so it
really had a very strong effect on me.
Dorothy would agree with Jane that it is something
about working with more disturbed clients which makes
the concept of projective identification meaningful:
We talked about it (projective identification)
a little bit last summer-although at the time
it didn't really make sense to me because I
didn't have anything to hang onto it. Although
I was observing another student who was seeing
a borderline client, and there were times when
I was just observing and I'd end up feeling
things I didn't expect to feel. So I guess I
was prepared a little in observing. And I can
recall this therapist saying things I now say
in the room-like this person's clenching their
fists and like holding onto their chair-like
you kind of hang onto yourself. I have the
same experiences a lot of the times-like 'ok,
here it comes.' So I say the same things I
remember her saying and it's really funny. But
I don't think there could have been anything to
prepare for being in the room.
What does Dorothy think about this now?
I think you've got to take them in-really not
as your own, but you've got to take it in and
digest it in a way that's not always
comfortable. Especially if they're not
particularly good feelings. I think that's a
requirement. I think that's necessary in
therapy.
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The accounts of Jane, Dorothy and Sharon illustrate
how experiences of conscious recognition and examination
enabled them to understand that their affect could
originate in their clients. Perhaps this possibility is
so unimaginable to some trainees that they must
experience it before it becomes meaningful. Wendy
described her struggle with the concept of projective
identification as follows:
(I)n supervision sometimes we talk about thingsin the way that sounds more like projective
Identification like: 'You were feeling thatperson's anger.' I'll think about it in that
way.
.
.sometimes after the fact I'll think about
my interactions and my feelings in that waybut typically I don't... I don't feel them asthose they're somebody else's feelings. I feelthem as if they're my own feelings that are
connected to what's going on... later I might
think about them in a different way... It
doesn't feel real in terms of a gut level at
this point. It feels like it's more
intellectual. It's a way of thinking about it
and sometimes it leads me to a better
understanding
.
Wendy's grasp of projective identification is
largely intellectual at this point. She has not had the
dramatic and intrusive experience described by Dorothy
and Sharon nor the containment of alien feelings
described by Jane. Perhaps she has been the recipient of
projective identifications but they have been understood
as her own affect. The concept of projective
identification sounds psychotic to her; Dorothy and
Sharon would say that, indeed, it feels psychotic! Wendy
expressed her confusion:
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It just doesn't sort of-T n^r.'*.
tiese a^e bo^^h ^% psychotic- that
soL^hoHn^^rb
^ ^'A:d%'::^r%^ h'^^^trouble reco^nizij;^
.^Ll T^llLl'lZ IHTI m feeling that I don't want to have to dealwith recognizing and then deciding Is Tt lineor somebody else's.
Peter also was perplexed by the concept:
When I first heard about projective
^ ^^°^ght 'whooo, this is thetwilight zone! I don't go for this, how is itpossible given the laws of nature!'
Experiential learning is sometimes necessary to
complement theoretical exposure.
Peter's and Wendy's reservations echo objections in
the literature about the concept of projective
identification (Finell, 1986; Whipple, 1986). Rebecca's
comments illuminate some reasons why this is a difficult
concept. Her reflections speak to Wendy and Peter's
concerns:
(I)t's scary to think that someone else might
be able to put something into you. Not only
put something into you but your unconscious.
Something that's so scary that it's absolutely
unbearable. That people have that kind of
power, or that you can feel that people can
have that kind of power . . . ( I ) t ' s a magical
concept and I think that's anxiety
producing ...( T ) alking about putting feelings
into somebody else and making them act it out.
I mean, that's magic. And I think if you see
the use of projective identification as having
it's roots or beginning in a pre-verbal time,
it is magical-because that's a magical time,
that's a primary process time. And that's
scary, that's the time before words do much
good. And that's scary too because we're so
good at putting things into words, good at
intellectualizing, and we try to diffuse things
with words. Some of my thinking comes from (an
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article about) when words are uselec:., „K«nwords are unpredictable. And thaJ s ;ca^v
Put?in: ?r^Yl -y th^t byp t g It into words it will be ok and withpro3ective identification you're talkJna abontsomething that until we manage to do soL?hIngwith words, which is the way we n.ake H^^Ythink, acceptable to the client, we're ialkingabout one of those early experiences that areunmanageable, and who wants that.
Dorothy's evolution illustrates what seems to be an
important feature of the differentiation of the origin of
affect: the work becomes more manageable. Rebecca
agreed t
I think that's one of the things that I'vethought about the roost, because projectiveidentification and countertransf erence is one
of the most interesting parts of doing
therapy. And I've sort of come up with my own
sense of development about that. To me there's
kind of been this general sense of not
recognizing it, and not doing anything about
it, and just being kind of buffeted. And it
makes being a therapist so hard-I used to go
home-I mean that's a big part of taking clients
home with you for me.
Rebecca feels that resonating with clients'
projective identifications is part of the larger
challenge of learning to work with countertransf erence
.
In contrast, Jane felt her own difficulty was limited to
experiences with projective identifications. She agreed
that an increased ability to recognize when her feelings
are coming from her clients makes the work more
manageable.
What I think happens as a result of
experiencing this a lot is that I have a much
greater ability to make that conscious more
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w.. *cv,rx »w ± uninK tnat some of what I'mdescribing has to do with knowing that youdon't have to-that you may experience thatbriefly but it's not going to be an extensivelong term process.
Jane expressed more confidence than other trainees
in her ability to differentiate her feelings from those
of her clients. Dorothy wants to maintain susceptibility
to "taking on" clients' feelings but wants to process
them more quickly.
(I) like feeling susceptible-not that it's
going to overcome me but that I need to really
figure it out. To figure out what it means
for them and to figure out if it really is my
own or theirs. So the trick to me is not to
give up my susceptibility but to give up the
weight that that carries, or how bogged down in
it I can get. It doesn't scare me the way that
it used to, now it's just part and parcel.
It's more fun to me.
Rebecca also wanted to become more adept at recognizing
when she was the recipient of a projective
identification
:
I think what I'm shooting for, I'm trying not
be judgemental, but in thinking about how I
want to develop, it's not by becoming less open
to them because I don't want to be closed off,
but it's in becoming quicker to identify them,
and so not having them-being able to have it
almost as immediately as possible, at least the
identification part of it, because that's where
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^t%nrK^^"'K.''°'"^ ^° ^ ^^^t to be open to
i thinv ?' ^° "^^^ immediately. So
Rebecca is alluding to the potential of "identifying with
the projection" which then makes it more difficult to
recognize that the source of one's affect is in the
client.
Rebecca, Jane and Dorothy have been talking about
differentiating their clients' feelings from their own in
those circumstances when they are the recipient of a
clients' projective identification. The potential for
identifying with the projection is an important topic in
the literature on projective identification. The
literature on trial identification discussed in the
previous section suggests an equally important potential
for a prolonged identification during empathy. Under
such circumstances, the therapist loses sight of the
origin of her affect.
Rebecca took the problem of the differentiation
between her feelings and those of her clients further.
She had an expanded notion of the range of interactions
in which she experiences her client's affect. She
discussed how she has grown more adept at separating her
clinical work from her personal life:
They weren't really my feelings and they
weren't really a part of my life outside of
therapy. They were part of my interaction with
that person in the room.
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The Work Fq ^
Rebecca's realization that feelings arising fro.
Clinical work are not actually part of her life brings to
»ind Schafer's (1983) concept of a therapist's "second
self." schafer says that a therapist develops a "second
self" which he defines simply as "how the analyst
functions as an analyst." He maintains that the second
self functions differently than how the analyst functions
as a person outside of the clinical context; individuals
who are to some degree interpersonal ly impaired, be it
unempathic, grandiose, etc., are able to function
successfully as analysts due to the structure of the
second self. Schafer holds that this second self has the
capacity to regress in service of the clinical
interaction and likens this regression to Kris' (1952)
idea of the regression that happens as part of
creativity
.
Olinick (1973) presents a similar formulation of the
work ego as simply the analyst at work. The work ego is
defined in terms of functions such as the experiencing or
observing functions: the concept implies a personality of
traits, motivations and talent of the analyst at work.
As early as 1942, Fliess maintained that an analyst must
develop a work ego; and that this structure must have a
"special relationship to the id, the environment and to
the superego" because of the "constant oscillation
between fantasy and logical scrutiny" (p. 221). He says
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that part of the ability to be e.pathic rests upon the
relaxation of the superego's guard on the activity of the
work ego and a willingness to regress.
Little is said about the development of this second
self or work ego during training but it see.s that the
ability to be empathic and to realize that an
identification has occurred would be facilitated by and
would facilitate the development of this structure.
Brightman (1984) implies that part of a therapist's
development is the establishment of a secure professional
self not excessively vulnerable to threats to self
esteem. He says that an inverse relationship exists
between "the professional self's
vulnerability/grandiosity and a capacity for accurately
perceiving the other" (p. 312) or being empathic. Ralph
(1980), in his description of the milestones that
trainees progress through in the use of self does not
elaborate but says that ego development is a part of the
process
:
The changes that trainees report seem to be a
facet of ego development-that is enduring
changes in schemas about the self and others
(p. 249)
The concept of a work ego that has similar qualities
to the ego suggests that it could be formed through a
similar developmental process. Schafer's (1968) scheme
that ego structuralization happens through a sequence of
incorporation, intro j ection , and finally identification
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could apply to the concept of a^ r work ego. Some have
applied these ideas to the development of a therapist's
self as a function of supervision. Ford (1963) suggests
that supervisors are introjected and used as auxiliary
ego supports. This introject undergoes changes until it
is either incorporated (identified with) or rejected.
Jarmon (in press) also suggests that the supervisor
functions in something of an auxiliary fashion. He
compares the supervisory relationship to the holding
function of the mother- infant dyad. The supervisor
creates enough of a safe "holding" environment to allow
the supervisee to develop a clinical self by being able
to separate her experience from those of her patients:
"Her supervisor's task was to help her see the whole
relationship she had taken in and to differentiate her
experience from the patients." He sees this as a
parallel to early development: "in the context of a safe
holding environment, the infant can begin to
differentiate between self and other, i.e. to develop its
own identity." As "the self develops in part as a
function of its identification with others," Jarmon sees
that mutual identifications between supervisor and
supervisee contribute to the development of the
supervisee's therapeutic self through enhancing the
supervisee's ability to identify with and separate from
the patient's experience.
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Tansey and Burke ,i989, examine how the clinical
encounter impacts on the development of a work ego. They
tern, as "interactional introjects" the therapist's
introjection of the treatment process with each
individual patient" fo m
\
F i-j-ent (p. 51). They suggest that a
therapist's "work-ego" is the su. of these interactional
introjects. Interactional introjects consist of "working
models" (Greenson, i960) of both the patient and of the
therapist in interaction; the latter model being the
"different self experiences highlighted with different
patients" (Tansey & Burke, p. 91). The work ego is then
conceptualized as an "enduring representation of the self
consolidated over tin,e from images of self in interaction
with patients" (p. 51). As in Schafer's schema, the
various interactional introjects over time influence and
shape more enduring identifications and influence the
"self of the therapist in terms of ego functioning" (p.
51). Supervision would help the therapist become aware
of these changes in self experience.
The comments of Wendy illustrate these points. She
describes becoming aware of differences in her self
experience. She is developing a frame of reference for
her work ego.
I feel like I'm in a dawning understanding. I
feel I'm still really at the point where I get
surprised, where I'm noticing differences.
I'll notice this felt good, or this session
felt shitty. Or I feel like I can joke with
this person. Or more typically finding myself
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doing something and real-ir-i«« i .
Wendy's developing frame of reference would
facilitate her scrutiny of her inner experience to
understand how she is being impacted by her client.
This chapter has explored the impact of trial
identifications on the inner experience of therapists and
the thoughts of therapists-in-training on the origin of
their affect in clinical work. Differences among
therapists-in-training varied due to level of training.
Both theoretical and experiential learning had an impact
on trainees' perceptions of the origins of their
feelings
.
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CHAPTER V
DIFFICULTIES IN EMPATHIZING
Introducti nn
Learning to use the self as an instrument of
therapeutic investigation is a complicated and
challenging developmental process. Thus far I have
discussed a number of issues for therapists- in- training
in learning an empathic use of self. These issues have
included: (1) the oscillation and balance between the
observing and experiencing positions; (2) the impact of
trial identifications upon inner experience and how to
use the resulting affect; and (3) the intersub jective
communication of affect. This chapter will explore how
empathic functioning is affected in the treatment of
clients who are working on issues also salient in the
therapist's life and the loss of boundaries during
empathic moments.
Working with Similar Issues
The previous chapters have explored the processes of
therapists-in-training learning to recognize that affect
evoked in clinical interactions, though experienced as
one's own, can be understood as originating in one's
client. This perspective on the intersub jective
communication of affect serves as a vehicle for enhancing
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one's understanding of the therapeutic interaction,
supervision can help trainees learn to shift fro. an
experiencing to an observing position. This shift and
the recognition that an identification has occurred maKes
it possible for the therapist to think about the meaning
of her inner experience and therefore that of her
Client's. The ability to make this shift is enhanced by
the knowledge that affective responses can be used in the
clinical situation. The development of a work ego also
strengthens the ability to make this shift.
A trainees's task of separating from an experience
induced by her client becomes particularly difficult
when such a way of experiencing herself is one which, for
historical reasons, the trainee is accustomed to. This
occurs in the context of treating clients who are
perceived as similar to oneself and/or who are working on
issues important in the therapist's own life. When
working with such clients, the task of separating from an
identification is especially difficult in that the
identifications can evoke representations that reflect
one ' s own
.
Lakowics (1983) suggests that both concordant and
complementary identifications can stimulate a therapist's
own conflicts and/or unconscious defenses against these
conflicts. He suggests that stimulation of the
therapist's conflicts can "prevent the therapist from
recognizing that the identification is coming from
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outside himself" (p. 251^ ai«^P- ^^ ). Along these lines, Basch
(1983a) says that a therapist can unconsciously defend
against affective responses due to not being abl
tolerate in a client what is defended against
oneself. Goldberg (1984) suggests if a therapist
anxious about an issue, an insufficient openness to trial
identifications can result. Alternatively, Tansey and
Burke (1989) formulate that transient identifications
be intensified by the activation of the therapist
historical introjects. Olinick (1969) suggests that at
the moment of a transient identification, the therapist
has the same conflict as the client. When this conflict
is familiar to a therapist, the transient identification
would be particularly potent. Jarmon (in press) suggests
that identifications will be stronger when a client is
important to a therapist. Finally, Berger (1987)
suggests that a therapist may be drawn into a prolonged
identification when operating from an overly sympathetic
state such that may happen when clients are perceived as
similar to oneself.
Comments from Michael illustrate these points. He
felt he identified with his client, Nathan, because they
struggled with similar issues despite generational
differences.
(T)here were certain dynamics that he had that
.
I think I share. That perhaps made me identify
with him more strongly and empathize more
strongly than with others or in a different
way. It really pushed the identifications."
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Failure was a salient issue both for Michael and this
Client. Michael had experienced Nathan's feelings of
failure as his own. He felt it was partly his
Identification with Nathan that led hi., in his words, to
"(catch)" Nathan's feelings of failure. As a result,
Michael experienced an intensification of feelings that
he felt already prone to having.
These formulations suggest that when treating
clients who are perceived as similar to oneself or who
are working on similar issues, trainees will face
particular and perhaps intensified challenges to
neutrality as well as to their sense of themselves as
therapists. These challenges will be explored in the
following section.
Increa sed Investment In The Work
The feeling of increased investment emerged from
the challenge of working with clients with whom one
identified. Both Sara and Wendy felt more emotionally
involved in their work with clients who had similar
issues. In speaking of Joanne, a client whom she
perceived as similar to herself, Sara said: "in some ways
it made me really want to help the person more... it
definitely made me feel more connected to her."
For Wendy however, the increased investment had
problematic consequences. Wendy sometimes wished that
her. client would change because she identified with him
and wanted him to experience the resolution she had found
in her own life.
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T TeLtle'Tr^' '''' frustrating for
^^^l^^- ^^^^^
aspects • ^^^'^^ify v^ith at least someof his issues makes it a little mor^intense. And adds some intensify to thefrustration and the protecti veJiess
Questions About Ohp's Rol^ Tho>-.p^„^
Wendy sometimes questioned her capacity to be a
therapist when her clients worked on issues that were
important in her life. At other times she felt
especially gratified because she could use her past
experience to help her clients. She recognized that when
the issue was not yet resolved it could be problematic.
(I)f i can use it-either to make some
connection or if I can use it to help me
understand it better-to help a question that's
useful or point out something in the process
then I really like that. I feel good. It
'
feels kind of scary but good. I feel like it's
useful. Like I was able to use something
that I've worked out for myself and it felt
really good to be able to be useful. On the
other hand, when I can't do anything with it,
when I feel like shit, this is the same thing
I'm struggling with I have nothing useful to
say, tell me when you figure it out', then it
feels really awful. Then I feel insecure and
question why am I being a therapist and I feel
very grateful for supervision.
When Sara identified closely with her client Joanne,
she also questioned her role as therapist.
The client was somebody who reminded me of
myself in a lot of ways. The issues weren't
identical, but she did remind me of myself in
some ways. We're similar in the ways she
thought about certain things, how she dealt
with certain things, some of her problems. And
the feeling was 'oh god, I don't know if I can
help this person, I'm doing the same things she
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does-l still do them ' t ths^i, •
handle then, better but .t tK ? ^^^^ ^
same thing and I don ^ know
'
person who is so muSh Uke T ' '"'^ "'^^
so much like I am So fe^nno^too^much alike, like we"r: f ^s^^tr^s^rrt".
Sara and Wendy questioned their role because they
were no more resolved on issues than were their clients.
Halpern and Lesser (1960) write that therapists are
better able to empathize in areas of life where they
feel satisfaction. Therapists are less defensive when
working on resolved issues than on active areas of
conflict. Sara and Wendy are concerned that their
conflicts impede the help they can offer as therapists.
When confronted with a client with a conflict similar to
their own, they relinquish the view that they may still
know enough about the workings of conflict, defense,
development, transference and countertransf erence to
serve as guides in their clients' self exploration.
Their tenuous sense of separateness and potential for
objectivity is threatened. In order to avoid this threat
one can imagine that some therapists might invoke a kind
of splitting defense that is characterized by an us vs
them perspective vis a vis their clients (Rausch, 1986).
The Constraints Of The Therapeutic Role
Sara's reaction to Joanne of feeling so much like
her-feeling "soul sisters sort of thing"-resulted in her
wishing to forsake the therapeutic relationship:
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The exploration of Sara's wish to befriend her
client would undoubtedly yield meaningful material about
how Sara experiences herself differently as a friend than
as a therapist. This was not pursued in the interview.
Her comments emphasize the extent to which the
therapeutic role can be experienced as constraining.
Sara seems to wish for the freer expression of a personal
relationship with Joanne but it is not clear why she
feels she could be of more help to her as a friend. The
clinical relationship requires interpersonal behavior
significantly different from that of a friendship: A
therapist "requires of himself the subjugation of usual
modes of human interaction-an abstinence imposed by the
demands of the method" (Marguelis, 1984 p. 1030). As new
therapists, not having yet internalized these new
interactions and lacking a well-developed work ego,
trainees miss social ways of interacting. Their yearning
for a familiar code of interpersonal behavior seems to be
most acute with clients whom are perceive as similar and
able to be imagined as a friend.
One constraint of clinical work is having to refrain
from overt shows of affection or nurturance. Therapeutic
giving is primarily through interpretation and empathy,
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osure. This
ng
not physical contact and self disci
constraint could be particular! .... uiFdi i ly problematic when worki
with clients with similar issue.; do^-ues. Peter described his
experience of having to hold back in his work with a
family Where the
..other struggled with health problems
similar to those his mother suffers from.
(The) mother is beqaina-r;:> i i -j r>« *
suDDori- f^r^r. K
'^''^'^^^'3 Calling for emotionalpport rom her son. All he rpaiiT/ ^ j
i c; QAi- ,,t^ =r^^ u 1- e iiy had to doIS get up and hug her. He wasn't givinq herany emotional support. And I was leeUng UkeI really wanted to and was holding r^yllif badhoping that son would do it... I knew I had to
L^MnrmirLrr^^^'^^^-^^-^^^^^^
Peter seems to be "feeling for" his client rather
than "feeling with" her, or with her son (King, p. 337).
He felt pulled by the mother's need for support and had
to struggle not to act in a sympathetic way toward her.
Because of his strong personalized response to the mother
Peter is unable to appreciate how the son experiences the
mother's communications. Because Peter is listening as
if it was he in the son's situation he is not able to
experience what he had told me he knew to be the son's
resentfulness and anger. Peter obfuscated his alliance
with the son when his own feelings took precedence. His
neutrality is compromised but because he recognizes the
feelings as his own personalized countertransference , he
does not commit the mistake of "assuming or insisting
that the (client) must of necessity feel what (he) might
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experience given his situation" (Basch, 1983b, p. 114-
115). Peter n,anaged to maintain a neutral stance
behaviorally despite his loss of emotional neutrality.
He does not seem to recognize that it is sympathy he felt
for the mother, not an empathic alliance with her or with
her son. Goldberg (1980) suggests that:
Compassion or sympathy in psychotherapy is likepoliteness: it is a natural part ofinterpersonal harmony but probably has nothingto do with psychotherapy... Unfortunately it hasaddictive properties and can become anindulgence, and become a substitute fortreatment. (p. 239)
Giving advice or problem solving are other
deviations from a therapeutic role which might be pulled
for most acutely by clients with similar issues. Sharon
was one trainee who had experienced this pull.
When I'm unsure or uncertain of something-my
tendency is to jump into the middle of it-I'm
very problem solving oriented, I try to figure
it out, solve it.
Sharon felt most tempted in these directions with
Susan, a client whose family is unusual and Sharon
believed, remarkably similar to her own. Sharon had
learned to problem solve as a way to cope with the same
dilemma Susan was currently facing. Her identification
with Susan exacerbated her problem solving efforts:
So I have to bite my tongue to force myself
from telling her how to do it. And I can't not
do it; it's a joke in supervision now. Every
time it comes up I have to put in at least a
little tidbit of an idea!: 'Have you
considered (doing such and such)?!' And
depending on how strong I am in the session I
do it less. Sometimes I'll really push it.
It's like I can't not do it. I can say to
myself, she's not you, for whatever reason that
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you were able to do this she's not able to dothis she's not ready, you've brought it up
course l^T'l
'°
• ^'^^ ^^^^
-
'
she s going to take.' But then there'..this other little voice that says 'But s^ewould be so happy, it would be pe^fec? Let'ssee, she could (do such and such).' It's Uke Ibecorne her at that point, or she becomes le orsomething. We aren't two separate people
Difficulty Maintaining a Sense of .c^.p ...
Sharon saw parallels in Susan's life and her own.
In perceiving these similarities she runs the risk of
projecting her personality and needs onto Susan. She was
aware of this:
I think it's more narcissistic stuff. i think
I know what the answer is if she would only doIt. And also her as a reflection of me- this
worked for me so obviously it would work forher. We're alike in certain ways in this
particular issue so she should be my little
clone and it would work.
Sharon's struggle to keep herself cognizant of dif-
ferences between herself and her client are admirable.
Her difficulties can be used to illustrate important
pitfalls experienced when treating clients with whom one
perceives similarities. Perhaps many trainees are not
conscious of the risks that Sharon sees.
I get confused about what's their stuff and
what's my stuff. I worry about if how I'm
conceptualizing what's going on for them is
really because I'm superimposing my own issues
onto them or not. And I think I understand
them, but then I worry that that's really very
facile, and that I may not understand at all
but just that there are a lot of similarities.
Sharon illustrated the need to continuously "put oneself
aside and attempt to doubt what seems obvious and clear"
in order to perceive the client (Marguelis, 1984).
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The line between e.pathy and the projection of one's
own conflicts on to a client is often difficult to
distinguish (Berger, 1987; Ferreira, 1961). "To project
one's attitude onto a patient
.ay serve as an unconscious
defense against unacceptable conflicts and n^ay interfere
with an accurate understanding of the patient" (Berger,
p. 31). This can result in a therapist's failure to
perceive the differences between himself and his
client.
From an alternative angle, Tansey and Burke (1989)
assume that therapists use a range of introjects from
their own life experiences as "potential models for the
identifications stimulated by the therapeutic
interaction" (p. 55). It is important that
"identifications based on introjects established
independently of the therapeutic process be scrutinized
closely for the degree of correspondence" with a client
(p. 55). The therapist's self awareness is vital here.
In the above illustrations, Sharon sensed that she was
not responding empathically but was seeing herself in her
client.
Sara at first also experienced difficulty keeping
herself separate from her client, Joanne, with whom she
felt so identified.
(I)nitially it was overwhelming. As time went
on I felt more able to use the feelings because
I could see-we aren't the same person, we're
not going to be the same person and I can be
helpful in spite of this weird sort of
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connectedness that I f^pi t ^ i • ,
this way than in otlel llses
'''' '^^'^^
The ability to be en>pathic is founded upon a
psychological sense of separateness (Schafer, 1959).
Empathic experiences do see. to involve moments of
"illusory merger" (Buie, 1981, p. 286) as will be
explored in the next section. However, these moments are
sudden, transient and more uncanny than what Sara and
Sharon have described. The chronic lack of separation
they experienced stemmed from failing to distinguish
their clients' mental states from their own. They were
each vaguely aware of this and described their struggle
to see their clients distinctly. Sara said:
Some of the time I wish I didn't have them,(the feelings) because I felt I could be more
objective and therapist like.
Sharon saw this as a problem most likely to occur when
she worked with people with similar issues. She
questioned whether she understood them or whether she was
only understanding herself:
(I)t engages me in a way that I think prevents
me from being as objective as I would like to
be. As a consequence I'm not really sure about
whether what we're talking about is really my
stuff or their stuff. I would say that it's a
feeling of the boundaries going down, and their
stuff and my stuff getting mushed up together,
and me not being sure of what it is I'm looking
at
.
Sara also felt concerned that what she was
responding to in Joanne were her own feelings. In
discussing whether she ever felt confused whose feelings
she experienced, Sara said:
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sometimes, and when I do I don't say anythina
the d^ff""""
^'"^ more I 've seen
wMch a^e he^r- ^^""^V " terms o£Whic r rs or mine. But mine do get
iTellLl". ^^-^ - differentiate
Clients Doing Thf> Therapi?;t's Own WorV
Elizabeth worried about inducing her clients to work
on her own issues. She had gone through an emotional
crisis during the year and found that all three of her
clients in the same week would work on issues that were
of concern to her.
The thing that has been most upsetting to melately is that the things in my therapy that
I've started backing away from and haven't
wanted to do because it's too hard, have been
things with my clients. And they've been doing
It and having these great.. that she would
suddenly have this great breakthrough and I
would think: "That's what I'm suppose to be
doing-that's exactly what I should be saying,
that's exactly what I need'... that part of my
strong feeling for them and part of my strong
identification with this person is that she's
doing my therapy for me. It was horrible to
realize that that was going on. The work with
her has been very good and it's certainly what
she needs to be doing, but to realize that I
was doing that and that that's part of why I
was feeling so strongly and identifying with
her-that was really hard.
Elizabeth realized that her identification with her
clients stemmed from the fact that they were doing her
emotional work. Apparently unaware that some consider a
strong identification a departure from neutrality, the
identification itself was not of concern to Elizabeth.
Sara also wondered whether the connection she felt
with Joanne emanated from her sense that Joanne could be
of help to her. This in turn made her want to help
Joanne more:
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Helping „,sel. whicr^^vlee^l^^Lrpp.^p^-t:^
Peter expressed concerns about how his work with the
family with an ill mother activated conflicts about his
own mother:
I realize I have this big countertransf erenceissue that I have to deal with. So that's whatI often feel. I feel like I need to help-to dosomething for this poor suffering person (themother). I have to say 'ok, how much ot thisIS coming from my need to help my mother.' Sothe feeling I get is one of concern to make
sure that I'm doing what's best for the client
rather than what's going to help me the most.
'
Thompson (1980) addresses circumstances such as
these when the therapist's conflicts are stimulated by
the work with a patient:
In such circumstances it is clear that the
patient and analyst have engaged in a
relationship which is likely to change both of
them. The analyst is forced to face aspects of
his instinctual life, defence or se 1 f- structure
(e.g. narcissistic vulnerabilities) which he
now must master or master anew by a fresh piece
of self -analysis
. (p. 187)
Sharon explored additional ways that therapists can
be drawn into helping themselves when treating clients
with similar issues. She experienced herself as wanting
to be a better mother to Susan than is Susan's mother.
I think there's a part of me that wants to be
generous with her, and wants to give her
something, and wants to be different from her
mother, and her mother is saying (such and
such), and I'm wanting to be the good mother as
opposed to the evil mother-because I hate her
mother-she definitely triggers that in me, I
hate her mother. So I want to give to her as a
good mother would instead of what her mother is
doing
.
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Since Susan faced similar problems with her mother as
Sharon had with hers, perhaps rather than hating Susan's
mother, Sharon is actually hating her own; she does not
know Susan's mother and has no relationship with her.
Sharon also considered that in her identification with
Susan, she was wanting to be a better mother to herself
through her generosity to her client.
Activation Of Th e Therapist's Conflir-tc
Many trainees considered the possibility that
treating clients with similar issues could be a source of
personal growth. For most, this was because being
confronted with their own issues through their client's
work made it necessary to work on themselves. Wendy
appreciated the value in this work but recognized the
risk of confusion between herself and her client. She
discussed her concern in terms of "taking on" or
introjecting aspects of her client.
There's ways in which people whose issues are
similar to mine are the most interesting and
exciting because there's the most potential of
growth to me. So it's challenging but also
exciting and attractive. Yet with respect to
this issue of taking on it's the scariest
because that's where I would be the most
vulnerable. I mean I don't know how much I'm
thinking about this because we're talking about
it or how much I thought about it at the time,
but I'm thinking well of course it wouldn't be
just any issue but would be things I'm more
vulnerable to taking on.
Wendy recalled an experience in which she identified
with a client's hand washing compulsion:
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(It) reminded me in some ways-l also used tn k
n^tl^rrtelf^' cleanliLss aia%":s.'°s
'
noticed I felt very uncomfortable about itand I mentioned it to my supervisor And Jh.neventually stopped doing i t'
. .
. ^ ?hlnk ?t
''^^
played into my own stuff in some ways i
about i^ and t^
'^''^^
^ didn't'thLkD It hen sometime like a week lat-e,- tfound myself doing this a lot and Tada theconnection.
Sara reported a similar experience of finding
herself acting in ways she had in the past and related it
to the contact with Joanne. m contrast to Wendy's
identification with her client's compulsive symptom, Sara
felt a more general identification with Joanne.
She's one of those people that is very
conscious of food, weight and physical
appearance. Sometime I am and sometimes I'm
not. When the case began that was an issue forher but I was in a 'It's not important to me
mode.' As the case went on, I found myselfdoing just what she does with food, and
worrying more about weight and all that stuff.
But the thing is, the thing that was funny was
that I knew it. It was like 'Alright, I'm
letting myself do this because I do these
things anyway, so I'm just going to let myself
do it again .'... Part of it was what was going
on with me personally anyway. But also, I was
like, 'Well, this is how she gets control in
her life, and that's how I've always in some
ways gotten control in my life so-since things
are out of control I'm going to get control
back and I'll use her way which was always my
way too.
'
Which I might not have done if it
hadn't been something we were talking about
because it had been so long since I did
something like that.
For both Wendy and Sara, old defensive maneuvers
were reactivated with their clients. A transient
identification "hit too close to home" and "stimulated a
pathological identification" (Goldberg, 1984, p. 63).
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This created difficulty for Sar^ ;.n^ l, ^ .y l a and Wendy in maintaining
the psychological boundaries between themselves and their
clients. Sara made a conscious decision to act liKe her
client, but Wendy had experienced her clients' effect as
"insidious." Wendy's experience was more disturbing and
influenced how she felt about becoming a therapist:
I noticed it, and I didn't like it because itwas disturbing. it was intrusive I d^dn
'
J
want to be doing this and it was disLrb^ng
life So r"'' insinuate-effect my'that made it disturbing also. ( B ) vinsidious I mean less conscious. It's onething to kind of feel bummed out or angry orsomething else and saying that being with thisperson made me sad or whatever, because that'ssort of part of the game. Or even to say
d^^^n' I ""r^^^ ^i^^ ^his client andecide to try to be more like them. But tofind myself being like a person unconsciously,
especially when it's something that I don't
even want to be, that's what was disturbing
It s the unconsciousness of it that I meant byIt s msidiousness.
.
.
(I)t's disturbing in the
sense that I like to think I'm captain of my
ship. And if I'm washing hands because of this-
what else, maybe I'm going to start having
other issues this person has. Just the sense
of being out of control
...( I ) f this could
happen what else could happen.
Defensive Moves
One final point about the challenges of treating
people with similar conflicts emerged in the interviews.
We have seen how working with such clients can stimulate
a therapist's own conflicts, often resulting in increased
and prolonged identifications. Alternatively, therapists
collude with clients to avoid overlapping conflictual
areas. Cohen (1952) suggests that when a therapist's
neurotic conflicts are restimulated
, five self protective
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in
or
". ence
maneuvers are often undertaken: l) an increase
activity; 2) a change of subject; 3) attacking the
client; 4) ending before the allotted time;
5) colluding with the client's resistance or ambival
about exploring the conflictual materials. Goldberg
(1984) suggests that defensive maneuvers on the
therapist's part impede the use of self. An inhibition
of empathy can result if the therapist has "walled
himself off" from similar conflicts within himself.
Finally, Basch (1983a) suggests that a therapist will
interfere with what a client is saying or doing if, due
to an inability to deal with similar conflicts, he
unconsciously defends against his own affective responses
to the material.
Several therapists were aware of such de f ensiveness
with clients. Michael was aware that his own conflicts
sometimes interfered with his ability to use himself:
The way it seems to happen is that something
doesn't fit in a session, something feels
blocked ... And some of those cases, when I
really dig down, and part of it I do myself,
part in supervision, part in my own therapy, I
can come to something often...! didn't react to
the situation the way I could have or was the
most helpful, why is that? I start on that.
And often times it's because of a personal
vulnerability on the issue or similar types of
issues
.
Sara said in talking about strong feelings experienced as
a therapist:
( 0 ) ccasionally in a session feeling overwhelmed
because things hit too close to home. So not
saying anything, or sometimes skirting an issue
because it hit too close to home.
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This section has focused on the problems therapists-
in-training encounter when they treat clients who are
working on similar issues to their own and with who. they
are identified. Therapists, clients and therapies can
also benefit when therapist and client's issues overlap.
The potential for the therapist's empathy may be
increased. Basch (1983b) suggests that the more similar
are the client and therapist in biological, cultural or
psychological features, the greater will be the
therapist's unconscious perception of "unspoken or
disguised affective communications." Despite the
difficulties in her work with Joanne, Sara felt that
their similarities had indeed, helped her to understand
Joanne better:
I feel like I"m being a good therapist,
basically that I understand better in some ways
what the person is going through.
About Empa thy and Issues of Boundaries
Throughout the interviews trainees spoke of
difficulty with being present and empathic with clients.
Sometimes this was because of having a bad day, sometimes
because feelings associated with a particular issue or
circumstance were difficult to empathize with, and
sometimes because it was characteris-tically difficult
for a trainee. For instance, Wendy, in thinking about
how she comes to feel empathic responded: "That's a good
question. I think that's a really important question for
me anyway, because I don't always." The difficulty of
138
being e.npathic was also demonstrated in trainees'
assessments that empathic moments were special. Michael
said that feeling empathic is "one of the high points of
doing this work. It feels good, it feels like at that
time I'm really understanding
...touching and being
touched .
"
Many difficulties in empathizing have been explored
in the preceding chapters and include ambivalence about
being emotionally involved, the difficulty of
differentiating the origin of one's affect, and the
challenge posed by working on clients' issues that are
also salient in one's own life.
Even apart from working with clients with similar
issues, difficulties in maintaining a sense of
separateness can be inherent in empathic functioning. On
one hand, clinical empathy involves a degree of
psychological separation between therapist and client:
"Empathy carries recognition and protection of the
objects separateness and individuality" (Schafer, 1959,
p. 353). On the other, empathic moments also involve
moments without boundaries: empathy involves a temporary
loss of one's psychological boundaries and is
preconsciously experienced as merger or fusion with a
client:
Every moment of empathy appears to depend on
merger. Merging seems to be the chief factor
in the most primitive, infantile forms of
empathy. On the highest level of empathy, the
level I have elsewhere termed generative
139
empathy, merging is included as one componentalong with others (sameness and likeness) oS amore articulated and sophisticated kind!(Schafer, 1968, p. 153)
Even those critical of models which emphasize the
role of merger or fusion as the basis of empathy agree
that empathic moments include feelings that are
experienced as fusion. Buie (1981), who maintains such
models are inadequate because they "treat the phenomenon
of merger or fusion literally" (p. 285), concedes that
empathic moments involve the experience of "illusory
merger" which "depends on a state of nondif ferentiation
of self from object" (p. 286):
The subjective experience of merging can be
located as one part of a person's internal
reactions to perceptions of another person, and
this part of his internal reaction involves the
illusory sense that self and object are fused
(p. 285)
Buie suggests this is possible through a "temporary
suspension of attention cathexis of the physical and
psychological boundaries of self and other" (p. 266).
Others also argue that the nature of the
identif icatory process of empathy involves a sense of
fusion. Beres and Arlow (1974) describe the therapist's
experience of transient identification as feeling at one
with the client. Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) suggest
that the nature of empathic identification is a
"momentary fusion of self and object representations"
(p. 137).
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Bmpathic functioning can alsc evoke a sense of
fusion When the cognitive component is
.ini.ized.
Empathy requires a cognitive transformation of that which
is affectively experienced (Basch, 1983b, Schafer, 1959;
Stern, 1985), a transformation involving the observing
self of the therapist:
woutrn.r''^^'"^ "'^^ ^^^^1^ cognitionld not achieve comprehension of another'sexperience; it would lead to confusing or
of dllt reactivity involving an illusions
(scifferrp: i:ir ^^^^
Comments by Sharon dramatically illustrate Schafer's
statements. She offered an analogy to describe how
affect operating without cognition results not in empathy
but a feeling of embededness in another's feelings:
I guess it means getting swept up-the analogy I
could make is-there are students on campus andthey're rioting and they're running through thebuilding and you're standing in the hallway.
And they run past you and you wind up getting
caught in the crowd and without even thinking
about it or making a conscious decision you're
running with the crowd too. It's that kind of
a feeling, and so the way to avoid that is to
go behind a closed door so they end up running
by.
But for empathy a cognitive component is necessary. A
previously used example from Sharon illustrates this
point
.
I think it could become empathy if I wanted to
let it happen that way, I mean if I wanted-I
think it becomes empathy when you put
consciousness into what's happened to you. You
can lose yourself and become disorganized by
what somebody is doing to you without it being
empathic, it only becomes empathic when you
recognize what the feelings are in relation to
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hysterical peopir::,et;;:r;:nr.r?ie^ l2,,
i:i c5!:n:r^but^?^^:\;;^,^?e----%f-Pi-
other. Th;y're clll^^sll iVl.ly^lV.ll ''''necessarily empathizing. They're defL??elymushing boundaries. But a therapist and
c ien?' 'r^'"^ ^^^^^^ a hystericall t and sort of getting caught up in that
IZVV^"""' ^^^^^ - tie saL
is a Jn??^'h''' °" saying- 'Oh, this
livt II
breathless, this is what that feelske, this must be what it felt like to herwhen she had to take her driver's test, it feltlike this.' That's when it becomes em^a^hy
Sharon has emphasized the necessity of the cognitive
element to transform what is experienced into empathic
understanding. In contrast, it seems that as beginning
therapists the cognitive element is sometimes considered
the entry into empathy. Two therapists spoke of having
feelings they thought their clients should be having.
Peter described the following experience:
So the son is in a situation that's somewhat
similar to mine, except mine is worse... I have
a lot of the same concerns that that the son
has. So sometimes in a session I feel things
for the mother that I think that the son should
be feeling, or sometimes I think this is what
he is feeling, or sometimes I say how come he's
not feeling this.
To ask "how come he's not feeling this" could be
considered a cognitive approach to empathy without the
affective resonance within. Such an approach is found in
the multitude of explanations about empathic
functioning. Buie (1981) stresses the need for
inferential reasoning without the affective resonance so
often stressed by others. Empathy can be arrived at
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through imagining the feelinoc n,=.» t, ,^l nngs that should be present but
were not, much as Peter has described. Greenson
,1960,
however, says this type of comparison or inferential
thinking does not
-provide the potentially intimate
correspondence with the nationf'^ i.n p e t s subjective experience"
(p. 90).
While an inferential approach to empathy certainly
has its place both in the literature and the clinical
encounter, such understanding would seem more vulnerable
to a therapist's projective and defensive errors than an
understanding informed by affective resonance.
Furthermore, it removes a therapist from the more intense
moment with a client. Empathy is often described as a
more immediate involvement of the therapist; as "moments
of uncommon and instantaneous intuneness with inner
thoughts or images" (Berger, 1987, p. 19).
The special sharing in empathic moments is captured
by Jane's comments:
J just have the sense sometimes that there's a
very deep level of understanding-of connection-
of sharing something that is really very
special in a lot of different kinds of ways. I
think during those times as a therapist I'm
much more in touch with the feeling of being in
the moment with a client. That there's a lot
less of a distance. Empathy means having
less distance in a relationship than you might
have had before you've reached that kind of
empathy
.
Several trainees echoed similar thoughts of how
empathic moments feels special and contain a
connectedness that is not normally felt. Perhaps this
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connectedness is how trainees are conceptualizing the
^o.ents Of uncanny closeness which is written about
(Basch, 1983b; Berger, 1987; Buie, 1981). Part of that
connectedness is experiencing a softening of boundaries
to allow a depth of contact rarely tolerated except in
moments of intimacy. Sharon attributed these special
moments of connection that others have mentioned to a
softening of boundaries.
I think that in terms of sort of really harddefinition of boundary issues-no, I don't think
I really lose a sense of who I am and I don'tbecome sort of psychotical ly disoriented Butin terms of a sort of soft definition-I thinkyes, there's some moments or some minutes when
I really feel connected in a way that I don't
normally with people and I don't normally outin my day to day life.
Sharon described her openness to this kind of
experience as letting herself be taken for a ride by her
client. This implies a giving up of control and letting
her "experiencing self" follow the clients lead.
Sometimes she does not want to let her barriers down and
therefore cannot empathize:
I decide I'm going to go on a train ride with
the person. They're going to take me somewhere-
like in the side car of a motorcycle. That's
really what it's like, it's like going on a
trip, a journey, and sometimes-some days I'm
just not willing to go. And that's when I'm
interfering with what their process
is ... Sometimes I'm not open or don't want to
let ray barriers down in the same way, and
that's when I think I'm not being as good a
therapist
.
144
Sharon felt that the extent to which she can
tolerate that experience is directly correlated with how
good a therapist she will be:
I have to say that I think the degree to whichyou can tolerate that is the degree to Shlc^
'
you 11 be a good therapist. For me anyway, mysense is that that is my working tool. Andbeing able to know someone else's reality is
what will enable me to be able to help
them.. I've come to realize that in fact it's
sort of a gift. I don't think that I-and I
would guess not many other people either-couldbe a very good therapist without having thatIt's necessary but not sufficient in that youhave to be able to make use of it as a toolAnd so that's sort of where my development is
at now. I've definitely come to accept it and
appreciate it and be grateful for it, but now
It's like I have to rein it in-learn how to
control it, learn when to let it be there and
when not to, or how to let it be there and to
be a fly on the wall at the same time.
Sharon feels that due to personal characteristics
she is susceptible to "getting swept up in the crowd."
In the metaphor of a train ride she described herself as
a good tourist because she is not invested in her own
view
.
I don't think it's something that I choose to
do or something that I really even have control
over-if you think of it as a skill, it's not
like I've practised it, or decided I wanted to
learn it and then went out and learned it.
It's much more like it's something that I've
become aware of and hopefully I'll be able to
make better use of... so I tend to think of it
more as just having to do with personal
characteristics.
While she is susceptible to taking on others'
feelings she is also quick to defend against it:
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In^ k'"
"l^^iv^ly susceptible to doing ita d also have a pretty quick defensive reaction
ordir^'"^ ^° ^ °f times iner to maintain my boundaries, I get sort ofcold and Withdrawn. That's an iverstatement?but I get cool and a little distant as a way ofnot letting myself take that on... to keep
myself from feeling like I might be losing
control of myself in relation to other peopleand their stuff. k'^^h>±^
Rebecca also spoke of needing to allow the type of
closeness that enables clients to use a therapist as they
might need to. In answering how she tried to remain open
to receiving her clients' projective identifications she
said
:
Not being afraid I think is one way. Having it
be ok to have that type of relationship.
Really not being afraid. And being empathic, I
think that's what keeps you open. It's the
anxiety that blocks that. If you don't want to
be that close or deal with those kinds of
things, I think it prevents those from
happening
.
Sharon's fear of "losing {her)self in relation to
other people and their stuff" reflects the blurring of
boundaries that can happen when one tries to be
empathically receptive. It has been suggested that
empathic activity can be threatening to the therapist's
mental health in that "one's narcissistic striving is in
danger through the introjection (during empathy) because
there is an identification with the object" (Fliess,
1942, p. 216). In empathic functioning, "the subject
temporarily gives up his own ego for that of the object"
(Olden, 1953, p. 112-113). An empathic transient
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identification is considered to require a "ten^porary
suspension of one's ego boundaries and thus a temporary
loss of self" (Goldberg, 1984, p. 42).
Several trainees discussed boundary issues in their
clinical experiences; however, they typically believed
these experiences were due to clients' projective
identifications, not to empathic receptiveness
. Empathy
also involves shifting boundaries to entail "a partial or
temporary loss of self and the reestablishment of one's
psychological separateness
. (Goldberg, 1984, p. 42).
Perhaps the fact that most trainees assumed that a
blurring of boundaries occurs only with clients'
projective identifications reflects the traditionally
drawn distinction between empathy and projective
identification (Tansey & Burke, 1989). Projective
identification is associated with counte rtransf erence
disruptions and negative affect while empathy is assumed
to be under the therapist's control, not disruptive, not
associated with difficulties of containing the material
and finally, not threatening to a sense of self. This is
an incomplete view of the empathic process and assumes
too clear a delineation of the origin of affect.
Jane was willing to tolerate a blurring of
boundaries in her clinical work. She specified that the
ability to tolerate a blurring of boundaries depends on
the ability to reestablish them. She was one respondent
who limited this to experiences with projective
identification
:
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^
-L^i-ionships
, and beinq willina
terrifying because you know that your clients'feelings aren't your own. But during theunconscious time that this process ishappening, being willing to open yourself upbecause you know that you have the ego strengthlater on to be able to do that kind of
separating out.
Sharon also learned that her ability to resonate
with her clients' feelings was made safe by her ability
to reestablish her psychological autonomy. Earlier in
training she thought that her susceptibility to her
clients inducing feelings in her meant that she was
crazy
:
I don't feel that way-actually I do still feel
that way but I think it's true for everybody,
and I don't feel that I'm labeled somehow. I
think that we all have that potential and
capability, and the test is not whether you can
feel those feelings but whether you can pull
yourself together again and go on with your
life, and I could do that so over time I came
to understand that it wasn't as terrifying as
it seemed to be at first.
Greenson (1960) posits that behind some "phobic
therapists" inability to empathize is such a fear that
they will be unable to regain their sense of self.
Before Sharon learned that she could pull herself
back she had interpreted these experiences as indicating
she was psychologically unsuited for the work. As
already mentioned, she had diagnosed herself vaguely as
having a disturbance of the self since she had regressed
so severely. Greenson (1960) describes why the temporary
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loss Of self that occurs during empathy could very well
be experienced as a self disturbance. He states that
"all that is peculiarly or uniquely" the therapist's is
relegated to the background through a "temporary
decathexis of one's self image."
Sharon experienced this as losing herself:
I think there are two aspects to the
unsettlingness of it. The first is that theirstuff IS very unsettling-these are very unhappypeople, and when you get a taste of it you get
a sense of how unhappy they are. But the
second piece is that when they're in you,you're not as much in you and that's really
terrifying. It's sort of a vision of thebodysnatchers. It's very odd to feel that you
can be that easily taken over and that you canbe that vulnerable or susceptible to losing-
don't know what to call it-losing the full
sense of myself as a discrete bounded entity.
Sharon's work with her first client Karen, who was
psychotic, laid the basis for thinking about these
issues. Sharon's experience had involved a regression to
a psychotic level of organization. She had to pull
herself back from a loss of boundaries and also from a
primary process level of thinking. Schafer (1959) writes
that empathy involves a regression of the ego to a place
of momentary "intrapsychic fusion of self-image and
object image" and also must allow for an "adaptive
employment of the primary process" (p. 359):
Regression may be resisted not only out of fear
of the content but more importantly, out of
anxiety that one may not find one's way back
from the less stable stages of organization to
higher and more stable organization. The
resistance arises from the fear of losing
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reality and ego boundaries, and being engulfed
In/'J/"". '^?c"!^' defenses, diffuse impulse,a d affect. (Schafer, p. 354)
Sharon's experience illustrates many of these
points
.
(It) didn't happen all the time-but there weretimes when the way that she was in the room
sort of scrambled my reality. it altered myperception. It dissolved the boundary between
me and her in such a way that I didn't have-I
no longer had my own personal perspective onthe world, and it's like we were knit
together. Not that I knew everything that had
gone on with her, or in fact if I had gone into
the grocery store I would have suddenly seen
the grocery store the way she saw it, but it
certainly gave me a feeling of what the flavor
of her life must be like, even if it only
lasted for 10 or 15 minutes. I experienced the
confusion and the terror, and the
disorientation that I think she was living with
all of her waking moments. And I wasn't me at
that time...(I)f I had to do anything I was
very scrambled. For a few minutes it would be
very hard for me to recover ray own sense of
self... It's like she took me on a train ride
with her. We'd walk into a session, and I had
a choice whether to pay attention to her, to
listen to her and try to follow her or not to.
If I had chosen not to, I don't think any of
this would have happened or if someone had been
observing behind the mirror. I don't think it
would have felt quite the same to me. But the
choice that I would make was that I would
listen to her. And once I started listening to
her; her way of seeing the world; how she
perceived it; how she strung her thoughts
together was totally different than mine. It
wasn't just that it was different-it was that
it was different and totally disordered,
totally illogical, and so I wound up in that
world
.
Interviewer: Can you say more about your sense
that your boundaries were no longer discrete?
Sharon: Well I think there were several things
to that. I don't think she had a sense of me
as a separate person. It took about six months
for us to be able to have what would be
considered to be a normal conversational style
of interacting. It took about that long for
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her to ever ask me a direct question, or forher to use my name, and I think that she didn'tsee me as a discrete bounded person. And whSshe was :ust kind of filled up the whole roomand incorporated me into it. And again I thinkI had a choice, I think I could have put a waUaround myself, could have pushed myself backaway from it, and maybe I would do that to agreater degree now, or more selectively now as
a therapist, but this was brand new to me Iwas eager to do it right and to be there withher. And so I just fell into it, time aftertime •
Sharon felt that now with more experience she would
be better able to observe what her client was doing and
its impact upon her. She would be more able to be a fly
on the wall and not lose her sense of her observing
self. She felt that what happened with Karen happens
with less disturbed clients also but to a lesser degree.
Dorothy's description of her work with Tina also
conveyed the sensation of losing her sense of being an
integrated self. She feels that it was hard to remain
intact as she responded to Tina's fragmentation:
Interviewer: You said how sometimes you feel
like you're losing your identity. Can you say
more about that?
Dorothy: It feels like I'm on this roller
coaster ride-sometimes I'll actually-not lose
consciousness but almost? Like the room gets
kind of-the background kind of blends in with
everything else and I just temporarily forget
where I am. It's like everything goes gray
and I really have to come back. It's like I'm
just really somewhere else. It's all kind of a
scary feeling. Going up and down with this
person. I'm sort of there but not there-I'm
sort of where she's at. So I really have to
think about seeing myself sitting where I'm
sitting and coming back to that. Because
she's changing who she is so much, I just get
so pulled into where she's at at that point
that I'm not at where I was before. The first
151
time it happened it was really kind of scary,
but now I'm getting more accustomed to it. I
can come back to where I am more easily.
Because I do need to do that to figure out the
process. But it can switch from her screaming
and yelling at me to being very depressed, or
childlike and wanting me to be nurturing. So
trying to be there in those different
capacities. Being pulled to be in those
different capacities, I just have-I just get so
involved in it or something that it's hard to
remain intact myself at that point. It's a
funny feeling.
Interviewer: It's hard to remain intact
because you're responding to her fragmentation?
Dorothy: Yeh, also I'm just so out there that
I sort of have to pick things up. I can
imagine how hard it is for her to do that if I
have a hard time going through it with her. To
just kind of put things together and come back.
I can imagine how that must feel for her. I
never have that experience with other clients.
It's weird... it's really like being in there
with four different people some of the time.
So no wonder I feel confused, and feel at times
like I lose my identity because she's
projecting so much stuff.
Dorothy's description echoes thoughts of Searles
(1979) as he explores the role of symbiosis in identity
development. He maintains that a symbiotic level of
identity is a therapist's "most reliable source of data"
about a client and happens through the projective and
introjective processes of empathy.
A symbiosis-based identity serves as one's most
sensitive and reliable organ for perceiving the
world, not merely by mirroring a world set at
some distance, but through processes of
introjection and projection, literally
sampling, literally mingling with in manageable
increments-the world through which, moment by
changing moment, we move. (p. 70)
Dorothy, Jane, Rebecca and Sharon's description of
their boundaries being blurred or let down evoke Ogden's
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(1982, description o£ the type of object relatedness that
is created as a result of a client's projective
identifications
:
The projector experiences the recipient asseparate enough to serve as a recepJacL forparts of the self but sufficien^Jy"^ '
TitrJ^^''^t^''^^ ^° maintain the Illusion of
Jp 36? '
""^^ projector's feeling
Dorothy and Jane both imagined that their clients did
experience this type of semi-differentiated relationship
as a result of having induced their feelings in their
therapists. Dorothy sensed that Tina feels closer to her
and described there being "almost a fusion part" to their
relationship at those times. Jane described how she
thinks her client viewed her as a result of inducing her
own anger in Jane:
I would think connected in a way that they
usually aren't. There's something about thatprocess that has to do with that kind ofintimacy, that connection or understanding,
particularly in an unconscious kind of way! So
in some sense I think it heightened that sense
of connection.
Jane, Dorothy and Rebecca have discussed boundary
issues only in relation to experiences with clients'
projective identifications. Sharon experiences boundary
issues as relevant to other interactions as well. She
compared her experiences of losing her boundaries with
Karen to her work with other clients.-
I think it's definitely there with these other
clients, but it's much more bounded, much more
limited. It doesn't happen for a whole
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it^do^^ ^^PP-n every session or ifI oes, It's ]ust a piece of a session.
Sharon would probably attribute this to her "suscepti-
bility to taking on", a "personal characteristic" that
she has learned to consider a gift. To the extent that
each therapist-in-training has a different cohesiveness
of self, a different defensive style and a different
propensity towards or fear of connectedness she may be
right. However, Sharon's thoughts about the relevance of
boundary issues to all levels of clinical experience is
supported in both the empathy literature (Beres & Arlow,
1974; Buie, 1981; Goldberg, 1984; Greenson, I960;
Schafer, 1959) and by those who consider projective
identification to be a part of the empathic process
(Tansey & Burke, 1989).
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
An empathic use of self is widely believed to be a
Psychoanalytically oriented therapist's
.ain instrument
of investigation in the clinical encounter. A use of
one's inner experience to understand that of one's client
utilizes emotional communications from a client that are
not available to more conscious reception.
Little attention is given to the developmental
vicissitudes of therapists-in-training learning such an
empathic use of self. A first step is appreciating that
internal emotional resonance is a useful realm of
information and does not indicate weakness or lack of
suitability for clinical work. Ambivalence must be faced
that the emotional involvement of clinical work is often
more than was anticipated. Trainees sometimes feel
regretful that clinical involvement can be so consuming
and demanding. As clinical skills develop, the emotional
intensity of the work becomes more manageable.
Understanding the nature of identifications in the
clinical encounter helps trainees learn to tolerate the
intensity of the work. Trainees then are able to
appreciate that changes in their inner experience often
originate outside of themselves from identification with
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a client's affect. This in turn enables trainees to
evaluate their induced feeling state, not as a surface or
enduring reality, but as information about a client.
Therapists must contain and sufficiently separate from
these induced feeling states in order to appreciate the
meaning of them. Therapists who believe induced feeling
states represent reality are at risk of acting out these
states, thus reenacting what a client has created in the
transference and induced countertransf erence
.
Separating from an induced state is facilitated when
trainees learn to view changes in inner experience as a
signal to separate from the affect and examine its
sources and meaning. The scrutiny of induced affect
involves questions such as: why am I feeling this way,
what caused it, and what purpose might it play for my
client for me to feel such a way. Information about
one's client as well as theoretical exposure are brought
into focus for analyzing what has been experienced. Such
analyzing is a function of the observing self of the
therapist; an oscillation and balance between
experiencing with the client and analyzing from the
position of the observing self constitutes the basis for
an empathic use of self.
Supervision is of enormous significance in both its
educative and holding capacities. Supervisory
interventions bring a trainee's awareness to what she
might be feeling. Such interventions model making the
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shift to the observina self rvug . The exploration of what can
be learned through analvzinn = ^. •y g a trainee's inner experience
demonstrates the use of the observing self.
Additionally, supervision helps contain a trainee's
anxiety, thus enabling her to contain and separate fro.
induced states.
In this study, trainees understanding and skills
increased across levels of clinical development. More
advanced trainees most clearly appreciated that one's
affect is useful and reviewed how disrupted they had been
by early intense experiences before recognizing its
usefulness. Developmental changes were also seen in
trainees' increased awareness that feeling states could
be induced in them by clients. Both theoretical exposure
and supervision had an impact on trainees' development.
However, such developmental differences did not hold up
under one condition, namely, working with disturbed
clients who induced feeling states that trainees felt
were alien or unfamiliar. Regardless of level of
training, feelings of intense rage or experiences of
momentary psychotic decompensation were made tolerable
for trainees only upon understanding that they had been
induced by a client. Trainees who faced such
difficulties early in training were especially
challenged. An additional change that did not hold up
across levels of experience was in the awareness of the
need to utilize an observing self. While there were
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differences related to developmental level, changes
Within the individual trainee were
.ore apparent.
Trainees empathic functioning appeared especially
vulnerable when trainees worked with clients who were
working on issues salient in thp tr-^^r.ne trainees own life or who
were perceived as similar. Trainees felt an increased
investment in this work which so.eti.es threatened their
objectivity and sense of themselves as therapists.
Trainees found it difficult to separate their own issues
from their clients' issues and sometimes failed to
distinguish their clients' mental states from their own.
Trainees also experienced a reactivation of old conflicts
and defenses when working with clients who utilized such
defenses to deal with similar conflicts.
A trainee's ability to use herself empathically is
facilitated by and facilitates the development of a work
ego or a therapeutic self. Such ego development is part
of the profound psychological changes that are part of
clinical training: Psychotherapy involves a "therapeutic
use of self" and the learning of psychotherapy requires a
"transformation of self" (Sharaf & Levinson, 1984). I
believe part of this transformation lies in a trainee's
experience of her psychological boundaries.
Empathy requires an interpenetration of boundaries
between therapists and clients. Empathic functioning
involves moments of psychic merger with clients and
sometimes a regression to symbiotic levels of relatedness
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and psychic organization ^i . As a trainee learns that she
can reconstitute hersplf =>r,^ -, , .n e and pull back from this merger
to reestablish her sense of identity, these experiences
becomes less threatening. Perhaps one of the most
profound transformations of clinir-^i ^r C nical development involves
a redefinition of self and other boundaries as boundaries
become both more firm and flexible. This has not only to
do With clinical skills, it has to do with changes at a
very basic level of personality.
The requirements of empathy are almost universally
seen as involving an individual with a secure sense of
self or one confident in their ability to maintain their
ego boundaries. Goldberg (1984) suggests that the
presence of a secure sense of self seems to be a
prerequisite for empathic responsiveness and that the
quality of the therapy depends upon the therapist's
personality. Similarly, Berger (1987) says that "the
development of the self has to be cohesive and elastic
enough to tolerate the requirements of empathy" (p. 30).
Too rigid ego boundaries prevent empathic resonance and
individuals with too permeable ego boundaries will
experience difficulty in reestablishing their autonomy.
A therapist's degree of autonomy effects her
empathic functioning (Greenson, 1960). A therapist with
too amorphous an identity will be unable to maintain
sufficient boundaries. Such an "uncontrolled empathizer"
will over identi f y . "Phobic empathizers , " with too
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restricted an Identity, „iu maintain too intellectual a
stance out of their fear that they win be unable to
reestablish their sense of autonomy.
It is a given that trainees enter clinical training
With varying degrees of intact rHr,-i/ij-ntac , rigid or permeable
boundaries. Some will start with hyperpermeable
boundaries and as a response to the threat of the loss of
autonomy, might alternate between being uncontrolled
empathizers and withdrawing defensively. others will
begin with rigid boundaries and will have to learn to
allow their boundaries to become more permeable. Part of
clinical training is establishing firm but flexible
boundaries, able to be permeable but strong enough to
allow the reestablishment of psychological autonomy. The
crucial role of personal therapy in this process is
obvious
.
Unfortunately, a professional choice to be a
psychotherapist does not ensure that one has such a
secure and flexible sense of self. Greenson (1960) and
Olinick (1959) both suggest that behind many therapists
professional choice are rescue fantasies and unconscious
reparative efforts originally developed in a relationship
with a depressed mother. Miller (1981) describes
depressed as well as narcissistic parents forming the
types of relationships with their children that later
motivate the professional choice of psychotherapy. She
asserts that children treated as narcissistic objects by
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their parents develoD "srurc^i,, *i p acutely tuned antennae" to the
unconscious needs of otherc: ^r,^ers and a weak subjective sense
of self.
Miller suggests that such people have heightened
abilities to empathize, however, I think empathy here
means being responsive to the needs of others and is not
being used in a more specific clinical sense. it is
possible that such empathizers have difficulty not being
too sympathetic and indulgent with clients. The
historical imperative of making a depressed mother feel
better or maintaining the self esteem of a narcissistic
parent could make difficult therapeutic interventions
that aim at helping people confront their dysphoric and
disowned aspects.
Miller describes such people as having a poor sense
of self and weaker ego boundaries; these qualities would
affect the empathic functioning of such therapists since
empathy requires a separation between self and object.
Such people often have a self image that they are very
empathic out of their experiences of being used
narcissistically by others. I question whether this self
image is problematic in that a clinical use of empathy
departs significantly from the usage implied here of an
acute and indulgent sensitivity to the needs of others.
Several trainees expressed the belief that their empathic
functioning came naturally and implied that this ability
was one reason for choosing this field. I suspect that
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are
these potentially different views of e.pathy
problematic in obscuring a trainees understanding of the
need and ability to maintain a seoar^r.no ^-L" p ate ess from their
clients
.
Perhaps the choice of therapy represents, for the
individuals described by Miller, an attempt to work
through these issues. We have seen how becoming a
therapist involves learning how to use oneself
e.pathically. Perhaps for some therapists, relationships
with clients provide opportunities to meet again the
needs of others, but this time voluntarily. As a
therapist, the caretaking of clients allows for a
maintenance of boundaries that need not negate the
trainees sense of self as did the earlier caretaking
relationships. However, allowing one's clients to use
one as they need to, exposes such trainees to the risks
of displacing their own needs and rage onto their
clients. Brightman (1984) suggests that only after
emotional healing of narcissistic wounds has occurred can
such therapists be effective.
Kernberg (1965) suggests that people who become
therapists to reenact reparative wishes towards their
parents are used to "doing" in relationships. Previous
experiences can make it hard for trainees to learn that
the most effective use of themselves with clients is not
an active doing, but to just be with them. As
therapists, too much doing, in the form of being overly
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interpretive prevents clients frnn, •C om developing their own
Objective sense of self. The previously adaptive
overuse of Intellectualizatlon and
.nowln, in order to be
able to control. leavp=: c^k 4-oi, ves such trainees impatient with "not
knowing." "Not knowing" is a st;.t*. k •y -Ls a e which is crucial for
effective clinical work. Ogden (1978^ n.Hn^•^yucii liy/B) paints a picture
of a similar type of parental relationship. He
formulates such narcissistic usage as a parent
projectively identifying into a child. Such children,
then, might become therapists out of a compulsion to
master being the recipient of projective
identifications. Perhaps even more than other
therapists, those with weak ego boundaries will be
engaged in a perpetual internal sorting out task.
To consider empathy as involving firm but flexible
boundaries raises a final consideration. Recent
scientific advances have called into question the
traditional separation of self and object of a
positivistic scientific paradigm. Earlier conceptions of
human nature did not so clearly delineate the individual
as an autonomous isolated unit. Such a delineation
allows for the splitting and projection that contribute
to both international conflict and to the travesties
visited upon the environment. Empathy is the basis for
cooperation and mutual subjectivity and a view of empathy
that includes an interpenetration of psyches suggests
that we are all more a part of each other than we feel.
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APPENDIX A
CONTACT LETTER
Dear
I am writing to invite von 1-0 k«
masters thesis research i II <l ^^ ^ Participant in my
experiences of therapists i.^ ^'^vestigating the
identification. ContJoversv"and'"''? ^'^^ Projective
concept of projective H^^rL confusion surround the
meaningful concept to tou fo^''^'°"''' ^
study. The only'^crJ^erJa thatTh'
""^'^'^'^^^'-^ in this
for you to either c^rre^Mv ^^^^ ^ "^^^
supervision or to have receiv^d'osvcrn^'^"""'^in the past. This does not n /!^ ?°'^^"^"''^ supervision
orientation nor do you need ^o'co^^iS'in psychoanalytic theory
^^ s der yourself versed
I would like to interview you twice forapproximately two hours each time ThrfT.^i- • .
will take place during March or earlv AorJ^interview to happen in' Hay. Z :dd Lo^J the'interviews I would like you to rt^^c^ ^ !
projective identif icatioHha? ^ll llllTrlT Tollconfidentiality as well as that of you? cUents andsupervisors will be protected. Clien
I hope you will consider participating. Pleasereturn the bottom of this sheet by March ( ) if you areinterested or have any questions and I will contact you.
Sincerely
Joan Copperman
To: Joan C.
_
.
Phone Number:
Would like to participate
—
I have some questions before deciding to participate
Please check one:
In first year of seeing clients
In between these two
Last year before internship or post internship
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW
experiences wl?h p^ojec^lve Iden^'^''":' " °"
.y letter to you,%hrc:;::pTp o" Uve ' ^"Identification does not need tn\l I
your participation inVstudy ^'U^e^a k
'°
questions about your clLicarexpL nc Tt^l^"including in our discussion the conceprorp^o jectiveIdentification. However, you should feel free to brinathe concept in. At the end of todays ' s inCrv^ew J'U hegiving you something I've written about p^ojec^IveIdentification that I'd like you to read before the nextinterview. And I would find it helpful to know ^ow ifprotective identification is a meaningful conc™o Jou?OK. Any questions? Alright, let's get started
1. What year in your training are you? How long have
von
^^^'""^
u
^^i^^^^- Which types of teams havey u been on and what type of supervision have you had?
2. At this point in your training, how would youdescribe your theoretical orientation, if you have one?
I'd like now to focus our discussion on some of your
experiences with clients. These could be experiences
either in a particular session or could describe a
general dynamic with a client. It will probably be hard
to remember at first, so take your time. Most people
have found it helpful to take a minute to review their
clinical experiences to organize their thoughts. I'd
like you to think about one or two cases in which you
experienced fairly strong feelings. However, you need
not limit your answers to these cases and some of the
questions may not relate to your experience.
3. In thinking about these cases, can you tell me about
one or two experiences when you felt v.ry strong
feelings, how you dealt with them, and what you thought
about having these intense feelings.
4. How did you use these feelings to inform you about
your client or the therapy?
For the rest of the questions, you don't need to limit
your answers to these cases.
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or after a session 2lllt,°Lr""t'' ' =""^"9
resemble the feelings thoCah^^ ^ ' ^""^ ^ =1^'"' -^hitholds of the.self, Per^aps'S^co^si":!;?
after a session"?hat''vou',K' l^^^ ^^^^ "^-^h feelings
felt, or in generaffeeL? ''^ ^""^ =l"nt
produced these "^0^?" ''"'^ =1""
feelings thoughts"* o?"i»I^fZ^^" =°"*"=e<5 about whosen r mages you were experiencing?
6- If you think about a cIibui-
particular difficulty w?th certain f ?*"^' ^^"^been times when you fou^d y"rse ? fHu^rih'"'/'?"when your client wasn't? ""^^eit eeling those feelings
me about any experieljces^^rwh'T""'"' ' "^^^
Clients feeling^ ^o^-^.j;;J-?Lrth:r:e^^:d ll'l^r'
7 Can you tell me about experiences of a client
as they were treated? "ciny ureatea
8. Could you tell me about experiences-either in a
wh.'^''^^^ "° " ^^"^^^1 ^V"-^i<= wiJh a clienten you felt reactions or feelings of a differentcontent or quality than you're used to'
HSHn'/°'' ^^^""^ feelings where you felt like they reallyaid t come from you? ^'=a^±
Have you ever had any clients working on issues you_ , TTwj./Yxiiy vjufelt you needed to work on? Did this intensify your ownfeelings, and if so, how did this happen? Do you thinkyour client contributed to this in some way?
10. Can you tell me about ever feeling so involved in the
relationship with a client or with your experiences in a
session that you lose your sense of what you generally
accept as real?
11. There are ways that a relationship with a client
resembles a relationship with a supervisor. Other than
the more readily apparent structural parallels, such as
meeting an hour a week, and talking to someone who
hopefully is helpful to you, are there ways that your
relationship with a supervisor has resembled your
relationship with the supervised client-for instance. Can
you tell me about ever feeling or behaving in supervision
like the supervised client feels or behaves?
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your client? similar to how you feel towards
13. In general, how suscf=>nt s m
other peoples' feelings? H^i K ^""^ ^° ^^^^"9 onfeelings lor your o^n? "^^^"^ confusing others'
14. How do you respond to feelinac. ^.^ .
client, or even feeling like the MS^ / "''"^^"^^ ''^^^ ^(i.e., scared of, open towards .^ii i^^"""" ^°threatened, gratified washed .'t ^ '^^^ confused.
When this inioi;es experiencing'"
""^'^
that make you feel judaeinenf!^ ^^''"''^^^^ ^^V^
for you? H^w opeJ ^o'
^h'^Jk^^ou^^^r J^L^
^'^^
l^l^^^onsr-''"^^ of^elf,%^?o.^^-:,,
ore
-?^y^LryourclLnL-\C?
-^h^ ^ l^^^
To be asked if this information has'noralready" emerged
:
Can you tell me about how you tend to work withClients; for instance very act lie"
, T^n;n-dire^:^^^ andwhat you're trying to facilitate or accomplis^by beingthis way? (silences) ^ o
Questions 17 through 24 to be asked if enough time- ifnot, go to question #25
17. Can you briefly describe a few clients that you'veseen that stand out in your mind and tell me what it isor was like to be in the room with them.
18. Could you describe each of these clients as an
animal, or give me a list of adjectives to describe
them. How would each client describe themself. What'syour sense of where the concordance comes from?
19. Have you ever felt so involved in the relationship
with a client or with your experiences in a session that
you lose your ability to step back and reflect on the
process?
How about ever feeling particularly cut off from a
client? Did this related to issues your client was
working on? Do you think your client felt this way also?
20. How do you use your inner process to inform you
about your clients or about the process of a session?
For instance, if you're anxious, how do you interpret
this?
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you or ca^e from you more than them? ""^cted
a;;Ue„°t\^rLa^:i^/;,f- experiences of feeUn, UKe
play out a role with them \url I ^ certain way or
role that someone in thei^ l.l^ victimizer, seducer, a
What's your sense oJk^u^^^ Played?
that role? °^ ^^^^ 90t you to play out
23. Have you ever fAit- •hK-^*-
has managed to provoke feenn^°^^ '^^'"''^ ^^^^^9 to or
significant person ?n hf^/H ^' ^^^^ ^^"'^
can you tel l^L^^^So^t ^^i 'L^^^L^c^/^H^ d •to realize it was a feelina th^^^n • ^^"^person had experienced^ ??h^ significant other
at
•complemenLr/Ja:^tifL^^;Ln?":o^1?aj:.:r%^ice^^°
When you felt reactions o? leeUnos ^hat':
'
intense than the situation sHi^S'to^merit?"
for you?^"''""' identification a meaningful concept
If no, end interview.
26. What exposure have you had to the concept ofprotective identification? (e.g. through readingclasses supervision) How has this concept becomemeaningful to you? ^^'-u ic
Has projective identification been identified ordiscussed either in supervision or on a clinic team?
clien^'s'^P^?^""^
^^"^^ ^""'^ recipient of a
If not, go to question #41.
28 Can you describe what happened, beginning with theinteraction with
the client. Please talk about how you lelt and how it
was resolved.
(Any or all of questions 29 through 40 might be
answered by this)
29. What helped you to see this (i.e., understanding
the concept, supervision, repeated nature of the
experience )
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30. What about this rl-i^r,^
realization that this w.; L!?"^^^^^^^^ ^° your
verbal/nonverbal behavlo? re^^jon J'-'" "^'^^-ry^rr latio ship patterns, issues)
31. In terms of how you felt ^ = r,your normal or usual wav nf^' ? compare this withhelpful in figuring out what w^^'l!^' difference
experience relate £o issuefth^ ^^PP^'"^' ^^^^
at in yourself?
sues at you feel you could look
32. How did this experienc*» 4-
your client.
^P rience add to your understanding of
33. Were you able to i-k-;.,
interpretation or i^anro^^Jr
^^^^^h: ^.^^t.^
fflt :b:^;%^rdur!nrthL^?Imrr^ -''^^^ ^^-^ -u or
your supeJ!;is%:r'''"'' '''''' relationship with
37^ How did this experience affect your feelinqs or vonr
rcUenT:ft:r'this^''^^'' you^eerto^^r^r^
Identification?
experience with projective
38. How did this experience affect your feelinqs aboutbecoming a therapist?; on your identity as a cUnician?
39. How open or vulnerable to clients' projectiveIdentifications do you think you are?
40 How has this concept been helpful for you inunderstanding your clinical experiences?
41. What do you think about the concept of projectiveidentification?
Ok. These are all the questions I'd like to ask youtoday. Give subject Appendix C.
Subjects for wh om interview ended at #25 : This is
something I've written about projective identification.
I've tried to present what I think are the most important
aspects of projective identification. I'd like you to
read this twice-the first time as soon after this
interview as possible; the second time close to the
second interview. At the second interview we'll talk
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more about projective identif ir;,t iquestions or comments abou^ tJJs s?^; "^^^^^11^ ^nywe can talk before then If you like ' °'
^^i^o-FT^SffSive'ld^n^??^' tL°n^ "^^^concept that is used in ^"^"^^^^tio , because it is a
I'd like you to read Jhis ,^1'''
"''^^ "^'^ confusion,
about it. Before"e sJart ^h^""'" ^''^ ' ^""^ """"
talK about si^ilar^tie^^nd' £ e^ir^jrunderstandings of the term Ok? T^rt lthis t„ice-the first time as soon aftfr Jhis^?:!/"possible, the second time close ?o t^» /Of course, „e can talk befSrr^hen itMrilV."''"''"
'
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APPENDIX C
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
participation in this s?,^^v "^"""S-
about protective identiflj:^;^^^,
Copperman, the principle investiop,tnr t .
I will be asked to describe asne^t^ ; "^^^^^and thattherapeutic relationshJp^aL^th^r p
l^l^r^^^s^' ^^^^ - anr?:riin.s about
I also understand that I may ask questions of theinvestigator at any point during ?he interviews and that
Lder.t question asked of L. iunders and that I may end participation in the study atany point and that I will not be penalized in an^ way
I understand that all interviews will be audiotaped andthen structured notes or verbatin transcripts w??! bemade from the tapes. All of the information I provide inthis study concerning my clients, my supervisor andmyself will be kept completely confidential. Ifinformation I provide is used for publication, my nameand all other identifying information will be altered.
I have read and understand the nature of this project and
what is required of me. I am willing to participate as a
subject in this research study.
Signature Date
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